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ABSTRACT 
 Since the June 2014 establishment of the “caliphate” by the Islamic State, there 
has been an alarming increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Europe. Concurrently, 
wave after wave of migrants from war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
have landed on Greek shores—and the shores of other southern European countries—in 
search of safety and freedom. Could the increased number of migrants entering Europe 
have any correlation to the greater incidence of terrorist attacks in Europe? This thesis 
considers the effects of the Islamic State sending trained operatives, including foreign 
terrorist fighters, into Europe through Greece disguised as migrants. This thesis also 
explores the impacts of the migrant crisis on the Greek government and society. Further, 
it analyzes the security implications for the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). This thesis concludes that if Greece, the EU, and NATO 
policies remain unrevised, the migrant crisis will continue to present grave challenges, 
including transit and recruitment opportunities for terrorist operatives in Europe. This 
thesis recommends greater EU and NATO coordination in receiving, hosting, processing, 
and identifying migrants entering Europe, notably via Greece. 
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The migrant crisis in Greece could in some circumstances become an existential 
threat to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
One of the most pressing threats to security and public order in the EU and NATO, the 
migrant crisis in the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, has yet to be resolved. What are 
the specific threats and challenges imposed on the EU and NATO by the migrant crisis? 
Do NATO and the EU have the necessary skills and capabilities to solve this crisis? What 
solutions have these organizations proposed to remedy this crisis? 
Undocumented migrants pose potential security risks because foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTFs) can mask their movement to and from conflict areas by utilizing the 
irregular migrant crossings highlighted in the Greek migrant crisis. Since the June 2014 
establishment of the “caliphate,” there have been 29 terrorist attacks in North America and 
Europe that can be linked to Islamic State (IS).1Terrorism and its link to the migrant crisis 
through foreign terrorist fighters posing as migrants constitute a significant threat to the 
Alliance, the EU and their member states. 
One expert suggests that over 5,000 “Western” foreign terrorist fighters have 
traveled to Iraq or Syria since 2011.2 Several estimates put the total number of FTFs at 
20,000, making the wars in Iraq and Syria one of the largest receivers of FTFs in history.3 
The fact that FTFs could be posing as migrants travelling to Europe through the irregular 
                                                 
1 Tim Lister et al., “ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2,043,” CNN, 
February 13, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/; Alice 
Foster, “Terror Attacks Timeline: From Paris and Brussels Terror to Most Recent Attacks in Europe,” 
Express, August 18, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-
Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism; The terrorist group in discussion has several 
names and abbreviations of its name that are widely accepted to include, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), and Da’esh. This thesis will refer to the group as the Islamic 
State (IS). 
2 Allies Under Attack, The Terrorist Threat to Europe: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee On 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, And Trade And The Subcommittee On Europe, Eurasia, And Emerging 
Threats Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs House Of Representatives, 115th Cong. 1 (2017) (statement 
of Mr. Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director Program on Extremism George Washington University),  
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg26045/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg26045.pdf 
3 John Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing: NATO and the Foreign Fighter Threat,” Parameters 45, 
no. 2 (Summer 2015): 52. 
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border crossings highlighted in the Greek migrant crisis poses a “serious and significant” 
threat to NATO, the EU, and their member states.4  
There is a high probability that IS foreign terrorist fighters have entered Europe, 
through Greece, disguised as migrants. According to the NATO website, “terrorism poses 
a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international 
stability and prosperity.”5 In contrast with the “indirect” threat of Russia asserting its 
dominance in eastern Europe, the threat of terrorism is felt all over Europe. The NATO 
Allies agree that the terrorist threat stemming from the migrant population is a serious 
security challenge facing Europe. According the July 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué:  
Terrorism, particularly as perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL)/Da’esh, has risen to an unprecedented level of 
intensity, reaches into all of Allied territory, and now represents an 
immediate and direct threat to our nations and the international community. 
Instability in the Middle East and North Africa also contributes to the 
refugee and migrant crisis.6 
Since NATO’s inception, there has only been one instance in which Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty has been invoked. It was in response to the terror attacks against the 
United States on September 11, 2001. After the Paris terror attacks in November 2015, 
France seriously debated invoking Article 5 in order to have an Allied effort to fight IS.7 
The French considered the need to possibly invoke this Article because they regarded the 
November 2015 terror attack as a significant and serious threat to their national security. 
Specifically, the French feared the foreign terrorist fighters posing as migrants coming 
from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to Greece and then on into the rest of Europe. After the 
November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, two Syrian passports were found near the bodies of 
the terrorists, leading to the “speculation that terrorists were infiltrating the refugee flows 
                                                 
4 Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing,” 51. 
5 “Countering Terrorism,” NATO, last updated December 19, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_77646.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
6 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO, para. 5, last updated March 29, 2017, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 
7 Krishnadev Calamur, “Will NATO Respond to the Attacks on Paris?” The Atlantic, November 15, 
2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/nato-paris-attack-article-5/416097/  
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to the EU.”8 This exemplified the fact that foreign terrorist fighters are posing as migrants 
while travelling from IS-controlled territory in the Middle East into Europe via Greece and 
the Eastern Mediterranean route. 
The number of migrants crossing into Europe through Greece from 2014 to 2016 
reached record-breaking numbers.9 In 2015, a new record was set for migrants entering 
Europe: one million migrants came to the region in that year alone.10 This migrant crisis 
has caused problems not only in Greece but throughout the rest of Europe. Greece is a key 
staging point for many of the migrants, most of whom intend to move on to other European 
countries. In comparison to Greece, Italy only received approximately 150,000 migrants 
via the central Mediterranean route during 2015.11 With the exponential increase in 
numbers of migrants, there is a significant risk that the number of foreign terrorist fighters 
transiting through Greece into Europe or into the Middle East is also increasing.  
The inability of the Greek government, NATO and the EU to reduce the flow of 
migrants transiting to other European countries represents a significant shortfall in security. 
Is it possible that undocumented migrants pose security risks as potential foreign terrorist 
fighters that can mask their movement to and from conflict areas by utilizing the irregular 
migrant crossings highlighted in the Greek migrant crisis? This research question requires 
an explanation from two broad areas of research. One area of research is terrorism, 
including foreign terrorist fighters, and the other is migration, specifically the illegal human 
trafficking and smuggling exposed in the Greek migration crisis. These two areas of 
research intersect at the study of foreign terrorist fighters posing as migrants transiting 
Greece. There have been many scholarly studies on terrorism and migration individually, 
but only a few scholarly studies have been conducted linking terrorism and migration. 
                                                 
8 Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes, Refugees Versus Terrorists, (Paris, France: The European Union 
Institute for security Studies (EUISS), 2016), 1. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/greece/resource/static/files/
refugees-versus-terrorists.pdf 
9 “Eastern Mediterranean Route,” Frontex, accessed March 21, 2017. https://Frontex.europa.eu/along-
eu-borders/migratory-routes/eastern-mediterranean-route/  
10 Frontex, “Eastern Mediterranean Route.”  
11 “Global Migration Trends Factsheet,” Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, Organization for 
Migration, 2015, http://gmdac.iom.int/global-migration-trends-factsheet  
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Furthermore, little scholarly work has been published linking terrorism and the Greek 
migrant crisis via foreign terrorist fighters transiting the eastern Mediterranean.  
There have been two major studies linking terrorism and migration. The first study, 
which was done to provide “quantitative evidence on the migration-terrorism debate,” is 
an article by Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Böhmelt entitled “Does Immigration Induce 
Terrorism?” 12 These authors hold that more migration into a country actually lowers the 
risk of terrorist attack.  However, their findings also show that if the migrants come from 
a country prone to terrorist attacks, the risk of the migrant in-flow has “a positive and 
statistically significant effect on terrorist attacks” in the country to which the migrants have 
travelled.13 In other words, if the migrants come from a country experiencing high levels 
of terrorism, the threat of terrorism is likely to accompany the migrants. Their article 
concludes with a policy recommendation that migration policies should not be overly 
restrictive and should not discriminate between certain types of migrants because more 
restrictive migration policies are “likely to have unfortunate consequences” such as more 
terrorist attacks.14 This article makes a clear and statistically significant argument for 
migrants coming from countries already prone to terrorist attacks contributing to higher 
levels of terrorism in the country to which they migrated. This article, even though it is the 
“first” of its kind and relatively recent, relies on data from 1976 to 2000. If the authors 
were to use more recent data, especially data since 2011, their findings would probably be 
different and more statistically significant as the number of migrants from countries already 
prone to terrorism has dramatically increased since 2011. Additionally, this article fails to 
identify the causal relationship between the migrants coming from countries prone to terror 
attacks and the fact that terror attacks increase in the country to which they migrated. The 
authors fail to mention that the possible linkage could be that some migrants are foreign 
terrorist fighters or FTF facilitators.  
                                                 
12 Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of 
Politics 78, no. 2 (2016): 572. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/684679  
13 Bove and Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 583. 
14 Ibid., 585. 
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The second article, “Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration” by 
Alex P. Schmid, is a more recent and comprehensive analysis of links between terrorism 
and migration than the work of Bove and Böhmelt. Schmid’s article makes the same 
foundational argument as the first article but goes beyond the correlation between terrorism 
and migration, especially in the case of the recent and ongoing European migration crisis. 
This study also analyzes the foreign terrorist fighter threat among the migrant population 
entering Europe. Schmid’s analysis concludes that there have been “a few foreign terrorist 
fighters” engaging in terror attacks who have used the refugee stream to return to Europe, 
but he notes that this is the exception to the rule.15 While his analysis is detailed and 
comprehensive, he fails to explore how dangerous the FTF threat actually has become since 
the start of the Greek migrant crisis and how dangerous it might be in the future. While 
Schmid downplays the threat of FTFs posing as migrants carry out attacks in Europe, his 
analysis is short sided. As the Islamic State is defeated, or significantly degraded, and it’s 
FTFs begin to return to their countries of origin in Europe, the likelihood of FTF posing as 
migrants inevitably increases along with the threat of possible terror attacks.  
Within the broader category of terrorism and migration is the study of foreign 
terrorist fighters. There are some studies and scholarly articles on foreign terrorist fighters, 
but relatively few discuss FTFs in the European migration crisis. John Deni’s article, 
“Beyond Information Sharing: NATO and the Foreign Fighter Threat,” provides solid 
background on the scholarly debate about the FTF threat. This debate is centered on the 
significance and seriousness of the FTF threat. Some scholars he references claim the FTF 
threat is serious but not significant, while others claim the FTF threat is both serious and 
significant. Deni subscribes to the serious but not significant school of thought. 
Additionally, he holds that NATO’s role in responding to the FTF threat in unlikely to be 
significant because the threat of FTFs posing as migrants is not significant. He also notes 
that NATO is not the best organization to respond to the FTF threat. In his view, the EU is 
the organization most capable of handling this problem. His thesis is strongly supported in 
the academic arena, but his view on the FTF threat may not be entirely accurate. The FTF 
                                                 
15 Alex P. Schmid, Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, (The Hague, The 
Netherlands: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016) 43. 
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threat is one the most significant and modern threats facing NATO and the EU. From June 
2014 to August 2017, there were 29 terrorist attacks carried out in Europe that have been 
linked to the Islamic State and foreign terrorist fighters.16 This is a significant number, and 
the FTF threat is therefore significant. The EU has been unable to handle the FTF threat 
alone and must cooperate more with NATO as it increases its response to the FTF threat 
and the migration crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
The other area of research to be examined is the Greek migration crisis, specifically 
the responses by Greece, the EU and NATO. Because the Greek migration crisis is a 
relatively new problem, only a limited number of scholarly articles have been published on 
the topic. However, research into the Greek migration crisis has produced more articles 
than the research concerned with linking migration and terrorism. As there is a lack of 
sufficient studies linking terrorism to the Greek migration crisis via FTFs, it is important 
to discuss and examine the literature on the Greek migration crisis and the responses of 
Greece, the EU and NATO. 
Greece’s response to this crisis has been limited and seriously deficient. Ismini 
Lamb points out in her article, “The Gates of Greece: Refugees and Policy Choices,” that 
due to financial constraints from the recent financial crisis in Greece, the country is 
overburdened and ill-equipped to deal with the migration crisis. Therefore, she argues that 
the migration crisis in Greece is not just a Greek problem, but a European Union problem. 
Her conclusion, which is consistent with what most other scholars hold, is that Greece must 
follow the European Union’s lead when it comes to policy decisions made by the EU in 
response to the migration crisis. While this idea may be the best way to deal with the current 
problem as quickly as possible, it leaves Athens acting as Pinocchio, the puppet, and 
Brussels as Mangiafuoco, the puppet master. Perhaps a better resolution to the migration 
crisis requires a more substantial and leading role by Athens. 
As previously mentioned, the EU is the best organization to deal with this challenge 
because the migrant crisis is politically and practically an EU problem. The main sources 
for the current data on the Greek migration crisis are the International Organization for 
                                                 
16 Lister et al., “ISIS Goes Global; Foster, “Terror Attacks Timeline. 
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Migration and FRONTEX. These two entities are able to produce near real time data that 
many scholars have yet to analyze and publish. Many scholars have published on policy 
decisions made by the EU, and most scholars, like those at the Think Tanks Tandem in 
their article “Terrorist Threats and Refugee Crisis: France and Germany Must Work 
Together to Rise to the Challenge,” maintain that only a coordinated European policy 
approach will solve the migration crisis and the threat of terrorism.17  
Other scholars are much more critical of the EU. In fact, Patryk Krugiel notes in 
his article, “The Refugee Crisis in Europe: True Causes, False Solutions,” that as of 
December 2016, the “EU still had no comprehensive strategy for dealing with the massive 
inflow of people claiming international protection, or for better managing migratory flows 
in general.”18 His main argument is that Europe and the EU must look internally, especially 
at the EU’s asylum policy, to solve the migration crisis. He contends that looking outside 
Europe at the other factors that cause migration is not the EU’s concern. However, other 
scholars, such as Sarah Glazer in her article, “European Migration Crisis,” argue that the 
EU, along with an international coalition, should try to stop the migration flow by dealing 
with its root causes such as the Assad regime and IS in Syria. She does note the lack of 
consensus within the EU on this approach, though. While most scholars believe that the 
migration crisis is solely an EU problem, they are failing to acknowledge the role that 
NATO and its military assets could have in assisting Greece, the EU and FRONTEX in 
solving the migrant crisis. 
Many NATO and EU security experts consider Russia the main threat in Europe. 
Despite the resurgence of Russia and the threat that Russia poses to NATO, others argue 
that the migrant crisis along Europe’s weakest flank is the biggest security concern for 
NATO and the EU.19 The adverse situation on Europe’s southern flank “appears to be real 
                                                 
17 Yves Bertoncini et al., Terrorist Threats and Refugee Crisis: France and Germany Must Work 
Together to Rise to the Challenge, (Paris, France: Think Tanks Tandem, 2017), 1. 
http://www.institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/terroristthreatsandrefugeecrisis-
thinktankstandem-jan17.pdf?pdf=ok  
18 Patryk Krugiel, “The Refugee Crisis in Europe: True Causes, False Solutions” The Polish Quarterly 
of International Affairs, no. 4 (2016): 42. 
19 Constance Baroudos, “Securing NATO’s Weakest Flank” Naval War College Review, Volume 69, 
No. 3 (Summer 2016): 164.  
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and growing.”20 Terrorism and its link to the migrant crisis through foreign terrorist 
fighters posing as migrants may constitute one of the most significant threats to the 
Alliance and its member states. As noted previously, the only time Article 5 has been 
invoked was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The only other time in NATO’s 
history that the invocation of Article 5 was seriously considered was after the November 
2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Article 5, NATO’s powerful pledge promising collective 
defense, was never used in response to Soviet aggression during the Cold War nor was it 
used in response to Russia invading and annexing Crimea, a part of Ukraine, which is not 
a NATO Ally.  
Therefore, current NATO and EU security policy must be aligned more toward the 
real and “direct” threat of terrorism that is a consequence of the migrant crisis in Greece. 
NATO’s political posture and rhetoric used to portray the Alliance’s stance on terrorism 
are well documented. NATO has taken a strong stand against terrorism since 2001 but more 
recently, as seen in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO has recast its stance on 
condemning terrorism. As noted in the communiqué, “The Alliance faces a range of 
security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; from 
state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid 
attacks.”21  
Besides its staunch rhetoric in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO is 
contributing to the fight against terrorism and efforts to address the migrant crisis in the 
Eastern Mediterranean in a variety of ways. This is shown mainly through “information 
sharing,” as John Deni describes in his previously mentioned article.22 In a Jane’s Defense 
Weekly report, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is quoted as saying that “our 
ships will be providing information to the coastguards and other national authorities of 
                                                 
20 Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing,” 49. 
21 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO, Para 5. Last updated March 29, 2017, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 
22 Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing,” 52. 
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Greece and Turkey” and that “NATO is laying down direct links with FRONTEX.”23 
Stoltenberg has also stated that “NATO ships will not do the job of national coastguards in 
the Aegean. Their mission is not to stop or turn back those trying to cross into Europe. This 
in no way represents a militarisation of the response to the crisis.”24 NATO’s Maritime 
commander notes that NATO’s current mission in the region is “surveillance of Aegean 
migrant trafficking.” NATO ships will “monitor patterns of life, track vessels of interest 
and conduct boardings on suspicion of illicit activity but also for training.”25  
NATO’s response to the threat on its southern flank is limited because in order for 
NATO to take a more active role in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Butch 
Bracknell in “NATO Approaches in Response to ISIL and International Terrorism,” it 
would require a UN Security Council Resolution or the invocation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter to grant NATO authority to act under international law.26 Without any of these 
prerequisites being met and Article 5 being invoked, NATO will not have a decisive role 
to play in the Greek migration crisis.27  
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the inability of the Greek Government, 
NATO and the EU to reduce the flow of migrants transiting to other European countries is 
raising the threat level and increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Do undocumented 
migrants pose potential security risks as foreign terrorist fighters that can mask their 
movements to and from conflict areas utilizing the irregular migrant crossings highlighted 
in the Greek migrant crisis? This question raises three other significant questions that 
ultimately lead to one, overarching research question. These three questions are: (1) What 
is Greece doing in response to the migration crisis within its own borders? (2) What is the 
                                                 
23 Brooks Tigner, “NATO Agrees Details of Aegean Sea Migration Crisis Mission” IHS Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, October 27, 2016. http://www.janes.com/article/64977/nato-extends-active-endeavor-to-
provide-new-support-to-eu-naval-mission  
24 Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO and Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis,” NATO, February 26, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_128645.htm  
25 Stoltenberg, “NATO and Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis.”  
26 Butch Bracknell, “NATO Approaches in Response to ISIL and International Terrorism,” The 
International Lawyer 49, no. 3 (Winter, 2016): 426. 
27 Bracknell, “NATO Approaches in Response to ISIL and International Terrorism.” 426. 
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EU doing in response to the migration crisis in Greece that is affecting other EU members? 
(3) What is NATO doing in response to this migration crisis and FTFs posing as migrants 
that carry out terror attacks in NATO member states?  
The overarching research question has been partially answered by Alex P. Schmid 
in his article “Links between Terrorism and Migration: an Exploration” and by John Deni 
in his article “Beyond Information Sharing: NATO and the Foreign Fighter Threat.” Alex 
P. Schmid notes there have been “a few foreign terrorist fighters” engaging in terror attacks 
who have used the refugee stream to return to Europe. However, he notes that this is the 
exception to the norm and therefore concludes that the FTF threat is not significant.28 In 
addition to Schmid, Deni argues that the FTF threat is only “potentially significant.” Deni 
does not openly take a stand in the debate but tends to lean closer to the view that the FTF 
is not a significant threat. While these two authors may be among the most prominent in 
the debate on this question, they are both mistaken in their apparent assumption that the 
FTFs posing as migrants is not a significant threat. The fact that there were thirteen terror 
attacks linked to FTFs and IS from May 2014 to August 2017 makes the case that FTFs 
that could have posed as migrants are a serious and significant threat.29 Furthermore, as 
Deni has observed, returned FTFs are more dangerous than a typical lone wolf attacker 
because of their combat experience gained while fighting in a conflict zone.  
Another consideration that could support the judgement that FTFs who could have 
posed as migrants are a serious and significant threat is the fact that most of the FTFs could 
still be engaged in combat for IS. Because IS still has a considerable foothold in Iraq and 
Syria, at least at this time of writing, most of its FTF are still engaged in combat. Europe 
has not seen most of its estimated 4,000-6,000 FTFs return because the conflict for which 
they left to engage in is still underway. It will only be after the fighting is over, if it ever 
truly will be, that Europe will see most of its FTFs return. These returned FTFs that stayed 
to the end with IS could prove to be the most dangerous upon their return to Europe.  
                                                 
28 Alex P. Schmid, Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, 43. 
29 Lister et al., “ISIS Goes Global”; Foster, “Terror Attacks Timeline.” 
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Most of these FTFs attempting to return to their native countries could use the 
irregular migration routes highlighted by the Greek migration crisis. The FTFs might prefer 
to use smugglers and human trafficking networks at irregular border crossings to avoid 
detection by authorities. Or alternatively, these returning FTFs could use fake Syrian or 
Iraqi passports and pose as migrants in order to return home. However, likely either 
scenario may be, the fact remains that some FTFs, and possibly the most dangerous ones, 
have yet to return to Europe. Unfortunately, it will take a large-scale, coordinated attack to 
prove this theory correct.  
Therefore, it is the goal of this research to recommend actions that can be taken to 
avoid such an event. In order to provide recommendations on this topic this research will 
analyze Greek, EU and NATO responses to the migration crisis and the threat of FTFs in 
an effort to find a solution and counter the threats emanating from the crisis.  
The research design of this thesis will be a qualitative analysis of the literature 
focused on a single case study, specifically the Greek migration crisis. The research design 
will also be based on acquiring information about the impacts of the Greek migration crisis 
from databases such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the EU’s 
border control agency Frontex, in addition to the main scholarly articles discussed in the 
literature review. This thesis will conduct a qualitative analysis of the literature pertaining 
to terrorism, migration, and foreign terrorist fighters in order to establish a connection 
between terrorism and FTFs posing as migrants as a part of the Greek migration crisis. The 
research will then examine the roles of Greece, the EU and NATO in stemming the flow 
of FTFs posing as migrants. Finally, the thesis will conclude with recommendations as to 
what these three entities could do in order to curtail the threat created by FTFs who pose 
as migrants.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I has introduced the topics of the 
migration crisis in Greece, terrorism, and foreign terrorist fighters to set the stage for the 
rest of the thesis. Chapter II examines the Islamic State in its current condition and 
examines the possibility of FTFs leaving Iraq and Syria to return Europe through IS 
organized crime networks. Chapter III explores the Greek migration crisis in more depth 
and the Greek Government’s response to the crisis, both the humanitarian response and the 
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military and police response to the security implications of the crisis. Chapter IV examines 
the crisis within the context of the EU. It explores what the EU has done in response to the 
security implications of the crisis. Chapter V examines NATO’s response to the crisis, 
specifically in the Eastern Mediterranean. Chapter V, in the conclusion, provides 
suggestions and recommendations for Greece, NATO and the EU to response to the 
security implications of the Greek migrant crisis. 
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II. THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE EUROPEAN MIGRANT 
CRISIS: TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME CONVERGENCE 
Since its abrupt beginning, “rising like a phoenix from the ashes in 2013,” the 
terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS), has captured sensationalized news headlines 
and articles alleging that terrorists have infiltrated the flows of migrants coming to Europe 
from Africa and the Middle East.30  Since the height of the migrant crisis in 2015, European 
states have been flooded with an unprecedented number of migrants fleeing war-torn 
countries and persecution in search of freedom and safety. Yet, paradoxically, the migrants 
face contempt, suspicion, and speculation stemming from the anxiety and fears deep within 
the European public because of the recent increase in the number and lethality of terrorist 
attacks linked to the Islamic State (IS).31 To what extent have the European anxieties and 
fears been substantiated by an actual threat of terrorists posing as migrants in order to 
infiltrate Europe? Could it be that the Islamic State is actually systematically sending 
trained operatives to Europe masked as migrants in order to plan and carry out future 
attacks? Or are these headlines striking fear and unrest in Europe based upon an 
unwarranted frustration with misunderstood and desperate migrants who have little or no 
affiliation with the Jihadi terrorist group?  
Regardless of which hypothesis is correct, the exact routes and methods by which 
IS sends trained operatives and foreign fighters to Europe have not been thoroughly 
explored. In those routes and methods may be found the nexus where terrorism, migration, 
and illegal smuggling overlap. Trained IS operatives and foreign fighter returnees could be 
utilizing the illegal migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks generated from the 
European migrant crisis to ensure their undetected movement into Europe.  
                                                 
30 Mohammed Hafez, “The Curse of Cain: Why Fratricidal Jihadis Fail to Learn from Their 
Mistakes,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 10, Issue 10 (November 2017): 1; This thesis will use the terms ‘migrant’ 
and ‘illegal migrant crossings’ to describe a certain group of people entering Europe and how exactly how 
they are entering. Although many of the migrants entering Europe are genuine refugees, this paper will 
avoid using this term as “refugee” is a special legal status granted only after an asylum request has been 
processed and granted. While the asylum system in Europe is the subject of much debate, the European 
Union’s asylum process is beyond the scope of research of this thesis. 
31 Zygmunt Bauman, Strangers at Our Door (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 1; Lister et al., “ISIS 
Goes Global”; Foster, “Terror Attacks Timeline.” 
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This chapter examines how IS could be motivated with financial gains and 
operational advantages to send trained operatives out of IS-controlled territory into Europe 
via the illegal smuggling route derived from the European migrant crisis. First, this chapter 
points out that IS could easily reverse the flow of its already established trafficking network 
in which goods and people flow into IS-controlled territory in order to allow trained 
operatives to make their way out of IS-controlled territory. Secondly, this chapter explores 
the feasibility of trained operatives or foreign fighter returnees masking their movement 
into and through Europe with the assistance of the smuggling and trafficking networks 
established in the European migrant crisis. 
As the Islamic State has suffered significant casualties, including the loss of Mosul 
and Raqqa, its de facto capital, the group has lost most of the “territory it once held in Iraq 
and is all but finished in Syria.”32 Consequently, there is a major concern that a large 
number of the estimated 5,600 IS foreign fighters could return to Europe. 33  While ample 
literature exists about the fact that foreign fighters are likely to return to their home 
countries in Europe, little information is publicly available on how exactly these foreign 
fighter returnees plan to avoid security authorities on their journey home or find another 
battlefield such as Libya, to the extent that the IS is defeated in Syria and Iraq.34  
The best possible solution for the European-born IS fighter to return home 
undetected is via the irregular border crossings highlighted in the European migrant crisis, 
particularly in Greece. Several scholars contend that “the threat of returning foreign 
fighters is further compounded by the refugee crisis.”35 Yet, according to A. Reed, J. Pohl, 
and M. Jegering, most are hesitant to admit that “terrorists systematically hide among the 
                                                 
32 Hafez, “The Curse of Cain,” 6. 
33 Alastair Reed, Johanna Pohl, and Marjolein Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter 
Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon. 8, no. 1  (The Hague, The Netherlands: The 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017): 5.  
34 Reed, Pohl, and Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat, 5; Despite articles 
such as “How ISIS Smuggles Terrorists Among Syrian Refugees,” there is little to no evidence suggesting 
exactly how the terrorists have infiltrated the refugee flows; Arturo Varvelli, “Islamic State’s Re-
Organization In Libya and Potential Connections with Illegal Trafficking” The Program on Extremism, 
George Washington University, November 2017, 2. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/
files/Varvelli%20IS%20Reorganization%20in%20Libya%20and%20Trafficking.pdf 
35 Reed, Pohl, and Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat,  6. 
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flow of refugees when trying to enter Europe,” despite “the fact that several of the 
perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015 did enter Europe by posing as refugees 
highlights the threat posed by limited control over the migratory flow.”36 As seen with the 
attacks planned and carried out by the Belgian terrorist cell linked to IS led by the notorious 
operative Abdelhamid Abaaoud, traveling into and out of Europe through Greece is 
possible via the illegal border crossings developed by migrant smuggling networks in order 
to avoid detection by authorities.37  
Migrants are attempting to continue their undetected journey, from Turkey across 
the Aegean to Greece, and then northward to countries like Germany and the United 
Kingdom, avoiding law enforcement authorities. If illegal migrants are caught on their 
journey, the current EU asylum process requires that they be sent back to the country 
through which they entered the EU, which is, in many cases, Greece.38 Therefore, it is 
conceivable that IS operatives and foreign fighter returnees could travel on these same 
routes to conceal their movements and avoid detection by authorities. 
It is probable that a terrorist group like the Islamic State, which already has a strong 
network for trafficking human beings and other illicit items into IS-controlled territory, 
could have motivations for exporting illicit items and trained operatives out of IS-
controlled territory in order to expand its influence and conduct operations abroad. IS 
could, for example, infiltrate Europe by exploiting the smuggling and trafficking networks 
already in existence, such as the routes created by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) nearly 
a decade ago through Turkey to smuggle migrants, terrorists, and illicit items through 
                                                 
36 Reed, Pohl, Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat, 6. 
37 Paul Cruickshank, “The Inside Story of Paris and Brussels Attacks,” CNN, October 30, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/europe/inside-paris-brussels-terror-attacks/index.html; Roderick Parkes, 
Out of Syria: Shifting Routes and Returns, Alert 8, (Paris, France: European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS), April 2017): 2.; European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017, (The 
Hague, The Netherlands: Europol, 2017), https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/
eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017  
38 Migrants emanating from the Middle East will make the trek starting from Syria, Iraq, or 
Afghanistan to Turkey then attempt the perilous crossing of the Aegean in a rubber dingy in hopes of 
reaching Europe, more specifically on the of the Greek Islands like Lesvos or Samos. 
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Turkey.39 The IS could gain control over these established routes and networks in Europe 
in order to exert its influence and dominance in the region. By embedding seasoned 
smugglers that are sympathetic to the group within the existing organized crime network, 
IS could successfully send trained operatives, terrorists, and foreign fighter returnees to 
Europe. IS could use these established smuggling and trafficking networks because of its 
long-standing connections in the smuggling and trafficking industry, including “IS-
affiliated smugglers” already in the network. This could prove advantageous for European 
operatives because, “in addition to cash, operatives sometimes also receive forged 
documents, and IS-affiliated facilitators or human smugglers help arrange their travel.”40 
Another factor supporting the IS operative’s successful travel to Europe could be the simple 
fact that most smugglers would not investigate the possibility that their “client” was a 
terrorist or a criminal—as long as they were paid.  
Operating the smuggling routes into Europe generated by people fleeing the 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan has become a robust and lucrative industry. 
Europol’s European Union Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 
reports that “more than 510,000 illegal border crossings between border-crossing points at 
the external border of the EU were registered in 2016. Nearly all of the irregular migrants 
arriving in the EU along these routes use the services offered by criminal networks at some 
point during their journeys.”41 Furthermore, using smugglers, by either migrants or 
terrorists, could prove useful because “migrant smuggling networks offer their services 
including transportation, accommodation, the provision of fraudulent documents and 
                                                 
39 See Figure 2: Financial flows to Islamic State resulting from the sexual slavery market in Nikita 
Malik, “Trafficking Terror: How Modern Slavery and Sexual Violence Fund Terrorism,” The Henry 
Jackson Society, October 8, 2017. 43. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/10/08/trafficking-terror-how-
modern-slavery-and-sexual-violence-fund-terrorism/; Mitchel P. Roth, Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrrorism, Volume 30, Issue 10 (August 2007): 909.  
40 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, Emilie Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 10, Issue 6 (December 2016): 17. 
41 European Union’s Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment Leaflet 2017: Crime in the Age 
of Technology, (The Hague, The Netherlands: Europol, 2017), https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-
services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017  
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information on contact points in other countries.”42 These established organized crime 
networks “can rely on their existing knowledge of routes and infrastructure used to smuggle 
goods across borders.”43 Finally, the assessment notes that the organized crime networks 
“involved in the trafficking of human beings often exploit existing migratory routes to 
traffic victims within the EU.”44  
 In addition to operational advantages, another factor leading the IS to establish 
smuggling and trafficking networks out of IS-controlled territory to transport operatives to 
Europe could be the financial gain from such endeavors. As previously noted, IS already 
has a well-established trafficking network into IS-controlled territory that results in a 
substantial source of capital for the group. A steady flow of sizable income has quickly 
made the IS powerful. IS finances are independent, diverse and lucrative. The top three 
sources of income for the group are (a) oil and natural gas, (b) taxes and fees, and (c) 
extortion.45 The IS trafficking network falls under the extortion category. One of the 
group’s major sources of capital, trafficking people and other illicit items into IS-controlled 
territory, generated almost $800 million in 2015.46 What would be the prospects if the IS 
actually wanted to tap into the European market in order to send people and goods out of 
IS-controlled territory? In her book Castaway: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee 
Crisis, Charlotte McDonald-Gibson ascertains that: 
The business of smuggling people into the European Union would be worth 
nearly as much as the illicit drugs industry. Billions of dollars would change 
hands each year, with tens of thousands of criminals profiting from people’s 
desires to reach safety. As long as there remained no legal routes for people 
to ask a European country to grant them refuge from war and persecution, 
                                                 




45 ISIS Financing: 2015 (Berlin, Germany: Center for Analysis of Terrorism, May 2016), 7–15. 
46 ISIS Financing: 2015, 15. 
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they had no choice but to pay criminals: The EU policy was actually 
creating the smuggling networks it kept vowing to dismantle.47 
Therefore, it could be beneficial for the IS to tap into the European smuggling 
market for financial reasons and operational advantages, as it would allow operatives to 
move into different countries without detection. Just as IS has well established smuggling 
and trafficking routes into IS-controlled territory, it could prove valuable for the group to 
have access to smuggling and trafficking networks leading from IS-controlled territory 
towards Western countries such as Turkey and Greece. The advantage would not only be 
the ability to cash in on the lucrative financial opportunities but also to solidify its future 
operational success by ensuring access and placement into Europe with the undetected 
movement of its operatives via the migrant smuggling networks.  
Given the perceived operational and financial advantages in sending operatives and 
foreign fighters to Europe, there is a strong case for IS to send trained operatives disguised 
as migrants to Europe via smuggling networks. According to leading experts, “at least six 
well documented attack plots in 2014–16 involve people with refugee status. In many 
instances plotters have instructed foreign fighters to pose as refugees upon their return to 
Europe.”48 Although these experts do not identify the exact routes used by foreign fighters 
posing as migrants to enter Europe, they do provide a strong case that the IS is sending 
operatives to Europe hidden in the migrant stream. According to one study, in “April 2016 
European security officials interviewed by the Washington Post, said ‘more than three 
dozen’ people linked to plots had posed as refugees.”49 Furthermore, with the 
unprecedented numbers of migrants arriving in countries like Greece, which “had neither 
the resources nor the willpower to register everyone who arrived…[and] had an incentive 
to let some people slip through and lessen the burden of overcrowded refugee facilities,”50 
                                                 
47 Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Castaway: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee Crisis (London: 
Portobello Books, 2016), 119–120. 
48 Nesser, Stenersen and Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism in Europe,” 10. 
49 Ibid., 10. 
50 McDonald-Gibson, Castaway, 190. 
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it is probable that more foreign fighters have slipped through cracks and entered Europe 
undetected.  
In conclusion, given the extremely porous borders within Europe and the fact that 
almost all migrants have used some form of criminal network to assist their movement 
through Europe, it is likely that foreign fighter returnees and other trained IS operatives 
have utilized the illegal smuggling and trafficking networks highlighted in the European 
migrant crisis to mask their movement into and through Europe to remain undetected by 




                                                 
51 European Union’s Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment Leaflet 2017. 
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III. GREECE AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS 
A. GREECE, MIGRANTS AND THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The Greek Government’s inability to reduce the flow of illegal migrants and 
potential foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) transiting to other European countries represents 
a significant shortfall in security.52 Indeed, one of the most pressing threats to security and 
public order in Europe resides in the migration crisis in the eastern Mediterranean and 
Greece. There is a high probability that foreign terrorist fighters have entered Europe, 
through Greece, disguised as migrants. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, it is possible 
that the Islamic State (IS) has systematically infiltrated the refugee flows and illegal 
smuggling networks into and out of Greece with the intention of planting trained operatives 
in Europe to plan and carry out future terror attacks.53 
 The nexus where the migrant crisis, terrorism, and human smuggling overlap 
inside Greece creates a remarkable security challenge. Illegal border crossing routes poses 
a dual security risk because a migrant or a foreign terrorist fighter can mask his movement 
to or from Europe to conflict areas by employing smugglers involved in human trafficking 
networks along irregular border-crossing routes highlighted by the migrant crisis in Greece.  
The inadequate Greek migration policy responses and the hostile social attitudes 
towards the migrants have propelled many migrants to opt for an expedited exit from 
Greece, mainly with the help of illegal smugglers. The situation in Greece has led to a 
perfect storm of security shortfalls in the chaos emanating from the migrant crisis, the 
                                                 
52 Also known as foreign fighters. For more information, see Alastair Reed, Johanna Pohl, and 
Marjolein Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving 
Phenomenon. 8, no. 1  (The Hague, The Netherlands: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 
2017). 
53 The Islamic State has a well-established, lucrative smuggling and trafficking network. See Figure 2: 
Financial flows to Islamic State resulting from the sexual slavery market in Nikita Malik, “Trafficking 
Terror: How Modern Slavery and Sexual Violence Fund Terrorism,” The Henry Jackson Society, October 
8, 2017, 43. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/10/08/trafficking-terror-how-modern-slavery-and-sexual-
violence-fund-terrorism/; Roderick Parkes, Out of Syria: Shifting Routes and Returns, Alert 8, (Paris, 
France: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), April 2017): 2. 
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illegal human smuggling networks, and the recent wave of violent terrorist attacks by 
operatives affiliated with the Islamic State (IS).  
The Islamic State stands to benefit, both tactically and financially, from the fragile 
situation in Greece created by the migrant crisis, especially as the Islamic State is losing 
territory in Iraq and Syria and many of its foreign terrorist fighters could be returning 
home.54 IS may have exploited the Greek government’s inadequate responses and the 
overwhelming public resentment in Greece towards the migrants. If so, the IS gains 
strategic and tactical advantages by sending trained operatives to Europe through Greece 
disguised as migrants using IS-operated smuggling routes.55  
The security concern with IS foreign fighters infiltrating the migrant flow into 
Europe is documented and discussed but most scholars contend that it is a rare occurrence. 
However, the exact routes and specific methods used by foreign fighters to infiltrate the 
migrant flows in order to mask their onward movement into and out of Greece have not 
been explored.56  Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes argue that IS is unlikely to have success 
in systematically infiltrating the migrant flows into Europe because the routes, such as the 
eastern Mediterranean route, are not “efficient or feasible,” and because “the routes often 
require time, money and stamina, as well as (often multiple) registration procedures.”57 
According to Funk and Parkes, “these jihadist groups—being criminal organisations, 
involved in the smuggling business—see the refugee flows as cash cows.”58 Yet Funk and 
                                                 
54 Human trafficking and illegal smuggling have been a major source of revenue for the Islamic State. 
For more information see ISIS Financing: 2015 (Berlin, Germany: Center for Analysis of Terrorism, May 
2016). 
55 There are many publications describing the smuggling and trafficking networks flowing into 
Islamic State-controlled territory. However, there is a lack of public evidence concerning the fact that the 
Islamic State could easily reverse the direction in which illicit goods and people are flowing along those 
illegal smuggling and trafficking routes. This thesis argues that IS could send people and goods out of IS-
controlled territory for strategic advantages, including sending trained operatives to Europe, by way of its 
own smuggling and trafficking networks, to carry out future attacks.  
56 Despite articles with titles such as Marc Thiessen’s, “How ISIS Smuggles Terrorists Among Syrian 
Refugees,” Newsweek, April 27, 2016, there is little to no public evidence suggesting exactly how the 
terrorists have infiltrated the refugee flows. 
57 Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes, Refugees Versus Terrorists, (Paris, France: The European Union 
Institute for security Studies (EUISS), 2016), 2. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/greece/resource/static/files/
refugees-versus-terrorists.pdf 
58 Funk and Parkes, Refugees Versus Terrorists, 2. 
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Parkes fail to make a crucial connection: a jihadist group like IS, which is also a criminal 
organization “involved in the smuggling business,” may in fact have the financial resources 
and strategic intention of sending well-funded, trained, and combat-hardened operatives to 
Europe masked as migrants by means of the smuggling networks that IS employs in order 
to circumvent the registration and security checkpoints.59  
The eastern Mediterranean route may be one of the most likely solutions for the 
migrant or foreign fighter to slip through cracks unchecked by authorities by using the 
illegal smugglers and smuggling networks along the irregular border crossings into and out 
of Greece. A thorough examination of the migrant crisis and the turbulent situation in 
Greece could provide some insight into how exactly IS could systematically infiltrate the 
flow of migrants and exploit the smuggling networks into Europe.  
B. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
The migrant crisis has caused political, social, and economic problems not only in 
Greece but also throughout the rest of Europe. Greece is just a stepping-stone for most 
migrants.60 It appears that most of the migrants have plans to move on to other European 
Union countries. A citizen of a European Union country can move through most European 
Union countries, sans documentation, with relative ease because of the European Union’s 
Schengen agreement. Most migrants can use smuggling and trafficking networks inside the 
Schengen Zone to move undetected from Greece to other European Union countries 
without documentation. One of the common routes for migrants transiting through Greece 
is the Western Balkan route starting in Greece and then moving to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, and Croatia and on into Hungary and Austria. 
This route, with its Greek origins, implicates other European countries in the migrant crisis 
currently troubling Greece. Therefore, other European countries, including those in the 
European Union, have a vested interest in how the Greek government has responded to the 
crisis.  
                                                 
 59 Ibid. 
60 McDonald-Gibson, Castaway, 190. 
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The size and scope of the migrant crisis in Greece are as vast as they are complex. 
Frontex reports that “in 2015, some 885,000 migrants arrived in the EU via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route,” most of whom entered the EU through Greece. With the exponential 
increase in numbers of migrants, there is a significant risk that the number of foreign 
terrorist fighters transiting into Europe through Greece is also increasing.61  
The migrant crisis has affected Greece and Europe as a whole in a multitude of 
ways. Beyond the immediate humanitarian issue as thousands of migrants have perished in 
the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas, foreign terrorist fighters and the huge number of 
migrants have raised immediate and potentially lasting political and security concerns for 
Greece and the rest of Europe. The Greek government’s inability to reduce the flow of 
illegal migrants and filter out the FTFs has created a political and social backlash against 
the migrant population, the Greek government, and perhaps the European Union’s 
solidarity that could have serious political and security implications.  
The migrant crisis in Greece has created one of the largest humanitarian aid efforts 
in recent times.62 Furthermore, it should be reiterated that many of these migrants are 
genuinely seeking refuge from war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Clear distinctions should therefore be made. Few of the migrants entering Greece are 
potential foreign terrorist fighters. In fact, most reports on the subject conclude that out of 
the many recent terrorist attacks in Europe, only a few have involved asylum seekers.63 
However, in the midst of the security shortfalls created by the migrant crisis in Greece, it 
is conceivable that additional foreign terrorist fighters, under direction and assistance from 
the Islamic State, have posed as migrants to infiltrate Europe. Therefore, Greece and its 
NATO Allies and EU partners should focus on two areas of emphasis. First, it is imperative 
to expose the routes and methods by which the migrants illegally enter Europe, including 
                                                 
61 Frontex, “Eastern Mediterranean Route.”  
62 Roxana Barbulescu, “Still a Beacon of Human Rights? Considerations on the EU Response to the 
Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 22, no. 2 (2017): 302. DOI: 10.1080/
13629395.2016.1194546  




via illegal smuggling networks that could be affiliated with the Islamic State, to slow the 
flow of migrants entering Greece and the EU illegally. The second area of emphasis should 
be on the Greek government’s and society’s responses, which have led many migrants to 
choose these illegal smuggling networks to leave the country.  
C. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE (OR LACK THEREOF) 
The Greek Government was certainly not prepared for the wave of migrants that 
washed up on its shores in 2015 and 2016. Athens’ “unwillingness to recognise the issue 
and to take even the most elementary measures to prepare for a more effective 
management” of the migrants would prove detrimental.64 Moreover, in April 2017 the 
Greek Ombudsman in a special report noted that 
There is still no integrated management plan, with a clear, stated and 
coherent narrative, with milestones and deliverables, targets and time 
frames of implementation that are complied with. Instead, the Greek 
administration is still operating in a state of emergency, which results in ad 
hoc arrangements and allows procedures, especially as regards the selection 
of contractors for services and goods, in derogation from the applicable 
institutional framework.65  
Most of the migrants have landed on the unprepared shores of small Greek islands. 
The inhabitants of Leros cater to tourists for their main source of income. After the 
relentless waves of migrants day after day “many Greeks on the islands where [migrants] 
washed ashore were sympathetic to the people fleeing war, [but] others were more 
concerned about the impression their bedraggled appearance could give the tourists.”66 
Quickly the small islands became overburdened. Despite the Greek government’s best 
intentions concerning established “hotspots” and reception centers to register and 
document the migrants, many of whom had little or no documentation after their arduous 
journey across the Aegean, the islands’ reception centers became overcrowded. There were 
simply too many migrants and not enough physical infrastructure, manpower and money 
                                                 
64 Migration Flows and Refugee Protection: Administrative Challenges and Human Rights Issues, 
(Athens, Greece: The Greek Ombudsman, April, 2017): 9. 
65 Migration Flows and Refugee Protection: Administrative Challenges and Human Rights Issues, 9. 
66 McDonald-Gibson, Castaway, 155. 
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on the islands to provide the migrants basic goods and services such as the “provision of 
nourishment, housing, health services and education, as well as security.”67  
The overall lack of infrastructure to register, process, and house the migrants was 
one of the biggest failures of the Greek authorities during the migrant crisis. These 
“significant shortcomings and inadequacies of the reception and screening system in the 
country, in combination with the increase of the flows from 2015, are the main reasons that 
the competent authorities failed to manage the incoming population.”68 Another 
noteworthy flaw among the many “shortcomings and inadequacies” to report was the 
failure of Greek authorities to correctly process and identify the migrants entering Greece. 
The Ombudsman reports that from January to November 2015, “Greece had registered 
136,798 new entries in the Eurodac system from the 575,242 arrivals which Frontex had 
counted during the same period.”69 In other words, “approximately one out of four arrivals 
were recorded following the correct and stipulated procedure and were directly traceable 
by the authorities of other countries.”70  
It appears that most migrants have never registered with the Greek authorities but 
have still been able to make their way off the small island of Leros. Many seem to have 
purposely avoided registering themselves in Greece. With or without passports, most 
migrants seem to be convinced that they should not register themselves in Greece because 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to travel to other European Union countries once 
they were registered in Greece as asylum seekers. Owing to the increased access to 
technology and perhaps connections to Europe through social media sites and the internet, 
many migrants appear to be fully aware of the implications of the EU’s Dublin Regulation 
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and are extremely cautious about where they register for asylum.71 The EU’s Dublin 
Regulation states that if a migrant requests asylum and is granted refugee status, he or she 
is entitled to healthcare, a residence permit, and the ability to work in the labor market, all 
provided by the country within which he or she applies for asylum.72  
Once in Athens, with no place to go, most migrants head for government-provided 
accommodation facilities, “several of which were intended only for temporary camping, 
whereas in other facilities the population was distributed in prefabricated containers, 
military type group tents or ordinary tents.”73 Despite the presence of non-governmental 
organizations, the living conditions inside these facilities have been appalling. The Greek 
Armed Forces have been in charge of many aspects of the migrants’ survival, including 
handing out food and providing health services.74  
With the multitude of Greek national government entities, local governmental 
agencies, and non-governmental organizations, the design and operation of the reception 
have been chaotic at best. The several entities attempting to provide aid have included “the 
Ministry of Migration Policy, the Ministry of Defence, the local Municipality and 
humanitarian organisations (e.g. Chios (VIAL), Ritsona and Oinofyta in Viotia, Polykastro 
in Kilkis).”75 These redundant agencies have created “an overlap of competences and [this] 
removes the possibility of comprehensive supervision and effective coordination by the 
main agency that has been appointed for this purpose.”76 These entities appear to have 
their hands in the pot, attempting to provide aid but also to receive the massive amounts of 
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EU relief funding.77 Perhaps the promise of funding for a Greek agency has been a stronger 
motivating factor to become involved in the relief efforts than the imperative of providing 
organized and timely aid to those in desperate need.  
The horrid living conditions, with chaotic and sparse government-provided aid, 
have been among the main factors for many migrants determined to make the journey 
onwards to other European Union countries in hopes of submitting an asylum claim 
elsewhere. However, as previously discussed, their legal movement to these other countries 
is difficult because of the EU’s Dublin Regulation. Therefore, most migrants opt for illegal 
smugglers to arrange their travel out of Greece. A second motivating factor for the migrants 
to exit Greece is the contempt and resentment that Greek society has expressed towards the 
migrants. 
D. RESPONSE FROM GREEK SOCIETY 
To repeat, the second contributing factor causing migrants to exit Greece could be 
the animosity the migrants have received from the Greek public. The recent influx of 
migrants appears to have contributed massively to political and social instability not only 
throughout Greece, but also throughout Europe. In her book, Immigration and Perceptions 
of National Political Systems in Europe, Lauren M. McLaren cites a European social 
survey conducted from 2002 to 2009, noting that “concern about immigration appears to 
be the highest in Greece, Great Britain, Portugal, Italy and France.”78 In subsequent years 
the migrants have captured the headlines, especially with the recent wave of terror attacks 
in Europe. As Zygmunt Bauman has observed, “TV news, newspaper headlines, political 
speeches and Internet tweets, used to deliver foci and outlets for public anxieties and fears, 
are currently overflowing with references to the ‘migration crisis’—ostensibly 
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overwhelming Europe and portending the collapse of the way of life we know, practise and 
cherish.”79 
Migration, and the resentment towards it, has increased not only in Greece but also 
worldwide. Trends for recent migration include “advancements in transportation have 
made travel faster and cheaper, and communication technologies have made it possible to 
connect with family and friends independent of physical distance.”80 These advancements 
in technology have allowed “Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans [to] cross the border to save their 
lives and livelihoods.”81 Yet instead of finding a place to re-establish their lives and 
livelihoods, the migrants have been persecuted by the public and almost forced to continue 
their journey onwards.  
Despite the horrid living conditions in their struggle to establish a new life for 
themselves, the migrants transiting and stranded in Greece received hostility and 
resentment from the Greek public. One explanation for the animosity towards the migrants 
stems from the idea that migrants “pose clear threats to these [national] identities by 
bringing with them seemingly different values and ways of life…Muslim migrants vis-à-
vis a predominantly secular Europe, for instance—may be especially difficult to reconcile 
with existing national identities.”82 The migrants’ different ways of life and beliefs do not 
seem to mesh well with Greek society. 
The Greek public has high levels of concern for immigrants because they fear that 
immigrants pose a potential threat to their national culture and values. In Greece, language, 
culture and religion are important factors for a shared cultural identity.83 Not only does 
Greek society view the migrants as destroyers of culture and values, many Greeks and other 
Europeans share the opinion that migrants present a security risk as well. Some believe that 
migrants 
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are portrayed as more willing to break the country’s laws than citizens…in 
the aftermath of 9/11, the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the 7/7 
bombings in London, foreign-origin or immigrant-origin citizens in the 
modern day may be suspected of sympathizing with and even participating 
in terrorist organizations, leading people to conclude that they create a 
serious security risk for the country.84 
With the recent increase in deadly terror attacks across Europe and the huge influx 
of migrants threatening the Greek way of life and culture, the rise of anti-immigrant 
sentiment has been almost inevitable. Owing to the anti-immigrant sentiment, far-right 
parties and political movements have surfaced and gained significant political traction. The 
reason the public may “prefer a fairly restrictive approach to immigration” could be that 
“they worry about the impact of immigration on national welfare, including social welfare 
benefits, education, and security; substantial numbers also express concern about the 
cultural impact of immigration.”85  
As for Greece, the current government has seen the rise of its own far-right party 
called the Golden Dawn. In 2012, the far-right “Golden Dawn political party—whose 
leaders gave Nazi salutes and whose supporters prowled the streets assaulting foreign 
workers—took nearly seven per cent of the Greek vote,” and its support seems to remain 
at that level.86 Golden Dawn is notorious for its extreme far-right political views, 
especially towards migrants. The current SYRIZA government in Greece, “rather than 
challenging the openly hateful rhetoric of Golden Dawn…launched Operation Xenios 
Zeus, the crackdown aimed at curbing illegal migration which ended up targeting people 
who had fled state brutality elsewhere.”87 The Greek government seems to have responded 
to the Greek public’s concerns about the migrants. As a result of Operation Xenios Zeus, 
which took place from August 2012 to February 2013, “around 85,000 people would be 
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stopped on the streets and taken to a police station, simply for looking foreign. All but 
4,811 had the legal right to be in Greece.”88 
The rise of far-right political parties in Greece and throughout Europe presents 
cause for concern. Perhaps “far-right parties have been on the rise in Europe in great part 
because of anti-immigration sentiment…concern about immigration…may be more likely 
to translate into dissatisfaction with the political system when there is a strong far-right 
party in the country.”89 It appears that there will be second and third order effects from the 
migrant crisis, including second and third generation immigrants who fail to assimilate into 
society. Greece and other “European governments of all political leanings are faced with 
the seemingly intractable problem of controlling immigration, [as well as] the existence of 
now permanent second- and third-generation immigrants who are often also the targets of 
concern on the part of the natives.”90 
Together, the animosity of Greek society and the sparse and inadequate aid and 
policy responses by the Greek Government have propelled many migrants to make their 
way out of Greece illegally. Typical migrants have been on the receiving end of the Greek 
public’s resentment and have not received the aid they need to re-establish their 
livelihoods. Thus, they have opted to make their way out of Greece illegally with the help 
of smugglers. For most of the migrants stranded in Greece, “there was no work…[and] no 
assistance from the government…and the threat of arrest [was] hanging over them.”91 In 
her book, Castaway: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee Crisis, Charlotte 
McDonald-Gibson, describes the motivation to leave. In her view, because of the bleak 
outlook for a life in Greece, most migrants have opted for a way out of Greece. Because 
there appeared to be no legal way out of Greece, most migrants had to settle for illegal 
smuggling networks yet again. Just as in the process of fleeing Syria and transiting Turkey, 
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the migrants had to spend what little money that they had left in order to make the journey 
out of Greece.92 
Typical migrants contact the same smugglers that family members have used to 
transit through Greece. They meet the smugglers on the outskirts of Athens, and from there 
the smugglers drive them north to the illegal border crossing point with FYROM at 
Idomeni. There, migrants have passed through the barbed wire with relative ease, as the 
Greek authorities have looked the other way as migrants crossed the border into FYROM. 
Once out of Greece, migrants have continued their journeys northward towards Germany, 
Belgium and other European countries with smugglers’ assistance. This examination of the 
path taken by many illegal migrants through Greece and into Europe shows how it is 
possible to conceive that the operatives of the Abaaoud cell responsible for the November 
2015 Paris terror attacks used similar routes, methods, and smugglers.93  
It is likely that migrants and foreign terrorist fighters could move through Greece 
with the help of smugglers. The smuggling routes through Greece into Europe generated 
by people fleeing the conflicts in the Middle East have become a robust and lucrative 
industry that jihadi groups have come to see as “cash cows,” just as predicted by Parkes 
and Funk.94 Europol’s European Union Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA) reports that “more than 510,000 illegal border crossings between border-
crossing points at the external border of the EU were registered in 2016. Nearly all of the 
irregular migrants arriving in the EU along these routes use the services offered by criminal 
networks at some point during their journeys.”95 Furthermore, using smugglers, by either 
migrants or foreign terrorist fighters, could prove useful because “migrant smuggling 
networks offer their services including transportation, accommodation, the provision of 
fraudulent documents and information on contact points in other countries.”96 These 
established organized smuggling networks “can rely on their existing knowledge of routes 
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and infrastructure used to smuggle goods across borders.”97 Finally, the assessment notes 
that the organized crime networks “involved in the trafficking of human beings often 
exploit existing migratory routes to traffic victims within the EU.”98  
Up to 75% of the migrants entering Greece from January to November 2015 were 
undocumented.99 Among these undocumented migrants entering Greece during this time 
were foreign terrorist fighters and members of the Belgian IS terrorist cell led by the 
notorious operative named Abdelhamid Abaaoud.100 This same cell included “several of 
the perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015” who entered Europe disguised as 
migrants through the island of Leros, thereby “highlight[ing] the threat posed by limited 
control over the migratory flow.”101 With the unprecedented numbers of migrants arriving 
on these small Greek islands, whose government agencies “had neither the resources nor 
the willpower to register everyone who arrived…[and] had an incentive to let some people 
slip through and lessen the burden of overcrowded refugee facilities,” it is entirely possible 
that more foreign terrorist fighters have slipped through cracks and entered Europe 
undetected.102  
Perhaps European-born foreign terrorist fighters can procure their return to Europe 
via the smuggling networks that got them out of Europe and into Syria. A BBC reporter 
was able to interview one such smuggler responsible for moving IS operatives out of Syria; 
the smuggler claims that “those highly placed foreigners have their own networks of 
smugglers. It’s usually the same people who organised their access to Syria. They co-
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ordinate with one another.”103 It is possible that foreign terrorist fighters have used the 
same smugglers that got them out of Europe into Syria in order to make their journey back 
into Europe undetected. The smuggling networks transporting migrants to Europe through 
Greece could also be transporting foreign terrorist fighters to Europe through Greece in 
order to coordinate and carry out future terror attacks. 
E. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
The evidence supporting the judgement that foreign terrorist fighters have 
infiltrated the migrant flows into Europe and have used Islamic State-supported smugglers 
to do so is circumstantial at best. However, it is plausible. Therefore, the Greek government 
and the European Union should place special emphasis on response efforts focusing on the 
illegal smuggling networks transporting migrants into, out of, and through Europe as these 
could be the same smuggling networks responsible for smuggling European-born foreign 
terrorist fighters back home, possibly to carry out future attacks. This threat could be 
exacerbated as the Islamic State loses territory in Iraq and Syria, and European-born 
foreign terrorist fighters could return to Europe using the same smuggling networks that 
arranged for their transport out of Europe and into Syria.  
Furthermore, European response efforts should focus on the Greek government’s 
inadequate responses towards the migrants as well as how Greek society has expressed 
animosity towards the migrants. These two factors could be major driving forces behind 
many migrants opting to leave Greece illegally with the help of smugglers. Additionally, 
since the closure of Idomeni and the rest of the Western Balkan route in March 2016, there 
have been up to 60,000 migrants still stranded in Greece. If these migrants continue to 
receive animosity and inadequate support in Greece, they could choose to leave via 
smugglers or worse, they could easily become radicalized by the Islamic State in their 
vulnerable state of limbo inside the government-provided aid facilities.104 They might still 
                                                 
103 Quentin Sommerville, Riam Dalati, “Raqqa’s Dirty Secret,” The BBC, 13 November 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/raqqas_dirty_secret.  




choose later to leave Greece with the help of smugglers but in a radicalized frame of mind. 
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IV. THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN GREECE: THE SECURITY 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU 
A. QUESTIONS FOR THE EU 
One of the most pressing threats to security and public order in the European Union 
(EU) lies within the migration crisis plaguing the eastern Mediterranean and Greece. The 
specific threat is the “foreign terrorist fighter” flow, amongst the migrant population, out 
of Syria through Turkey into Greece and then into the rest of Europe. Just as worrisome, 
the movement of foreign terrorist fighters could also take place in the opposite direction, 
out of Europe and into Iraq and Syria. The main security concern is that people from all 
over the world can travel to Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan to become trained terrorists and/or 
militants, and then proceed to Western European countries posing as migrants. The 
migration crisis has haunted European security institutions for the past few years, and yet 
the problem remains unresolved. 
The EU needs to reevaluate its security efforts within Greece and the Southeastern 
Mediterranean in order to solve the undocumented migrant flow and the potential foreign 
terrorist fighter problem. The migrant crisis could present a systemic and existential threat 
to the EU and Greece. Does the EU have the necessary skills and capabilities to solve this 
crisis? How effective has Frontex, the European Union border control and coast guard 
agency, been in suppressing the number of migrants entering the EU?  
B. DEFINING THE MIGRANT CRISIS IN THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Migrants crossing from Africa and the Middle East into Europe by means of the 
Mediterranean is an age-old issue. Historically, the number of migrants crossing into 
Europe has been significant but not problematic. The statistics concerning “irregular 
migrants” crossing into Europe are relatively new. Statistical assessments of the Eastern 
Mediterranean route starting in 2004 plot migrants fleeing from conflicts and oppression 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries of the Middle East, travelling to Turkey 
and then into Greece by sea and land. These migrants have normally numbered around 
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25,000 to 30,000 per year.105 Figure 1 shows the number of irregular migrants crossing 
from 2004 to 2011.  
 
Figure 1.  Number of migrants crossing into Europe using all four routes.106 
The number of migrants crossing into Europe using the Eastern Mediterranean 
route had remained fairly consistent, not reaching more than 50,000 in 2010. 50,000 a year 
was the new norm until 2015 when the number of migrants using the Eastern 
Mediterranean route reached almost 1 million. According to Frontex, the exact number of 
migrants using this route was 885,386 in 2015. Frontex records that: 
In 2015, some 885,000 migrants arrived in the EU via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route—17 times the number in in 2014, which was itself a 
record year. The vast majority of them arrived on several Greek islands, 
most on Lesbos. The numbers increased gradually from January to March, 
but began to climb in April, peaking at 216,000 in October.107  
Frontex specifies the number of migrants using the Eastern Mediterranean route and 
measures the number of illegal border crossings in the region, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Number of illegal border crossings into Europe using 
eastern route.108 
In regards to migrants entering Europe, 2015 was a record year. This migrant crisis 
has caused problems not only in Greece but throughout the rest of Europe. Greece is just 
the staging point for most of the migrants. It appears that most of the migrants have plans 
to move on to other Western European countries. The migrants, like EU citizens who can 
move to other countries, sans documentation, with relative ease because of the European 
Union’s Schengen agreement, can use illegal smuggling networks within the Schengen 
Zone to mask their movement. According to the EU, “the Schengen Area is one of the 
greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without internal borders, an area within which 
citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can freely circulate without 
being subjected to border checks.”109  
While Greece does not share a border with another country in the Schengen Area, 
it does share a border with another European Union member state, Bulgaria. Most migrants 
transiting out of Greece choose one of three main routes to leave Greece. One option the 
migrants can choose, after they have taken a ferry to mainland Greece from one of the 
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islands at which they arrived, is to take another ferry from Athens or Greece’s western port 
city, Igoumenitsa, and then to Italy. Once they arrive in Italy transiting to many other EU 
member states in the Schengen Area is fairly easy. However, this is a costly option and 
risky because of the risk of being detected at the port. The next route the migrants can 
choose is the land border crossing between Greece and Bulgaria. This is a feasible option 
because of the ease of travel between these two countries. The major draw-back is the 
border check point between Greece and Bulgaria because both countries do not belong to 
the Schengen Agreement. The third and most popular option is the Western Balkan route. 
The land based routes are preferable because these routes are not impacted by weather as 
much as the first route involving travel via the sea. The Western Balkan route saw close to 
800,000 illegal border crossings (mostly by Syrians) in 2015.110 This route, starting in 
Greece, then heading into FYROM, then Serbia, on into Hungary and then into Western 
Europe, has been “closed” because of a border fence built by Hungary. Despite the closure, 
migrants still use the Western Balkan route, but the route has shifted to Croatia.111 Figure 3 
shows a visual representation of the three main migrant routes.  
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Figure 3.  Eastern Mediterranean migration routes into Europe.112 
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS AMONG 
THE MIGRANTS  
Between 2014 to 2016 there were unprecedented numbers of people fleeing from 
the conflict areas of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Migrants from other countries have also 
entered Europe using the eastern Mediterranean route but the vast majority of the migrants 
come from the three aforementioned countries. Most have been “predominately young, 
male and Muslim” and “do broadly fit the profile of those most susceptible to 
radicalization.”113 After the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, two Syrian passports 
were found near the suspects’ bodies, leading to the “speculation that terrorists were 
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infiltrating the refugee flow in the EU.”114 Foreign terrorist fighters could travel from IS-
controlled territory into the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route posing as migrants.  
According to the International Organization from Migration, 66 percent of the 
migrants entering Greece and Italy are men, military-aged men ranging from 18 to 55.115 
This leaves a large number of migrants in the demographic range as possible foreign 
terrorist fighters returning to Europe that are “susceptible to radicalisation” just because of 
their age and gender. The Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey into Greece can be the 
most advantageous and sustainable route for the FTFs to use because of the fact the transit 
can be largely land-based in the case inclement weather like in the Mediterranean route 
during the winter months.116 In the absence of inclement weather, the migrants can cram 
into tiny rubber hull boats and make the short sea journey from the coast of Western Turkey 
to the small Greek islands like Leros or Samos.  
Foreign terrorist fighters from Europe have been reported to travel extensively 
across the globe. The 2016 TE-SAT reports that “in 2014, FTFs were present in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Chechnya, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; there is no 
indication to suggest that this situation changed in 2015. Syria and Iraq, however, 
continued to be by far the most prevalent locations for European violent jihadists.”117 
Moreover, the 2016 TE-SAT estimates that 5,000 European, mostly military-aged males, 
travelled to Syria and Iraq in 2015, only to return as potential FTFs.  
Travel to Syria and Iraq from Turkey is not difficult. First of all, travelling to 
Turkey from European countries is fairly easy. Ataturk International Airport is one of the 
largest international airports in the world, and it is accessible directly from almost every 
major European capital. Other travel options into Turkey include the over-land route by 
                                                 
114 Funk and Parkes, Refugees Versus Terrorists, 2.  
115 “Mediterranean Western Balkans Update - New Numbers from Italy, Greece, the FYROM,” Press 
Release, The International Organization for Migration, September 29, 2015, https://www.iom.int/news/
mediterranean-western-balkans-update-new-numbers-italy-greece-fyrom  
116 Funk and Parkes, Refugees Versus Terrorists, 1.  




railways, foot or wheels from either Greece or Bulgaria. Once inside Turkey, FTFs wishing 
to travel to Syria or Iraq can do so with relative ease by utilizing some the border crossings 
highlighted by the PKK. FTFs that wish to remain undetected by border control agencies 
will not have trouble travelling to their destinations in Syria or Iraq because of the conflict 
occurring on the south eastern border of Turkey. The Turkish government is heavily 
involved in an offensive engagement against the Kurdish forces and the PKK. This conflict 
has created a fog along on the Turkish border, and this could act as a form of concealment 
for the FTFs transiting to Syria or Iraq.  
D. THE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER’S MOTIVATION 
Since taking control of certain territory within Syria and Iraq in June 2014, the 
Islamic State (IS) has established the “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. This could be a potential 
motivating factor for FTFs to travel to IS-controlled territories because many FTFs are 
attracted to the idea of a utopian caliphate offered by IS.118 According to the European 
Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016, “IS considers it the duty of 
every Muslim to join it by migrating to the territories that it controls…Foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTFs) are equated with the companions of the prophet Muhammad that left Mecca 
with him on his emigration to Medina and are, on this basis, awarded a higher status than 
the local population.”119 Other motivations for FTFs are diverse and include the 
opportunity to fight Westerners, and to promote ideological, religious, or political aims.120 
Clearly, IS has forced tens thousands of people to flee their homes because of the mayhem 
and destruction caused by its actions. But IS understands that it can motivate those who 
feel like outcasts and who want to inflict harm onto Westerners, to travel to IS-controlled 
territory to join their cause. IS and what it stands for has an appeal to some.  
In September 2015, after the mass exodus from IS-controlled lands, IS launched a 
propaganda campaign, containing videos on many social media outlets, in attempts to 
                                                 




persuade the refugees to join IS instead of fleeing to “un-Islamic lands.”121 IS has done 
little to slow the flow of refugees out of IS-controlled lands but instead have opted to 
capitalize on migrants entering Europe. IS “recruiters may try to take advantage of social, 
economic, and personal problems that make individuals susceptible to radicalisation.”122 
The TE-SAT warns that IS has direct access to EU nationals prepared to carry out attacks. 
Additionally, TE-SAT reports that most of the FTFs have travelled to IS-controlled 
territories using their own genuine travel documents and under their own financial means. 
There are some instances in which FTFs have received financial assistance to travel but the 
assistance has come from local sources and not from within IS-controlled territory.123 The 
primary country through which the FTFs travel to IS controlled lands is Turkey.124 They 
arrive in Turkey from surrounding countries and from there proceed southeast to reach 
Syria and Iraq. More FTFs are beginning to “use more sophisticated tactics to enter 
Turkey,” thereby becoming more difficult to identify.125  
Once the FTFs have reached Syria or Iraq via Turkey and join IS, they return to 
Europe, possibly via the Eastern Mediterranean route, as trained operatives. TE-SAT 
claims that “the training and combat experience gained by the returning FTFs means that 
they will have increased capability to carry out attacks, either under direction or 
independently. Furthermore, some individuals undergo specific psychological 
conditioning…enabling them to carry out terrorist actions.”126 The TE-SAT reveals what 
is even more striking: many of the European FTFs are prominent leaders within IS and 
maintain communication lines with IS support networks from their home countries. 
As seen with the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and the attack on the Bataclan concert 
hall, and the Stade de France attack, the evidence gathered by the investigations of these 
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attacks suggests that FTFs with European origins have travelled to Syria and Iraq, received 
training from IS and returned to Europe, undetected by authorities.127 
E. THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS CAUSED BY THE MIGRANT CRISIS 
From 2014 to the end of 2016, there were 29 several major terrorist attacks carried 
out in Europe that have been linked to IS and possibly its foreign terrorist fighters who 
could have entered Europe disguised as migrants. The following is a list of the major 
terrorist attacks compiled from CNN and the Express.co.uk news articles outlining the 
attacks that are affiliated with IS but could have been carried out by foreign terrorist 
fighters posing as migrants:  
1. May 24, 2014. Brussels, Belgium—Three people killed and one more 
critically injured during a shooting at the Jewish Museum. The perpetrator 
was a 29-year-old French citizen who had traveled to Syria and spent a 
year there on his quest to become a radicalized Islamist.128 
2. November 13, 2015. Paris, France—A deadly, coordinated sequence of 
attacks killing some 130 people and wounded 350 others. The attackers, 
“armed with assault rifles and explosives, targeted six locations across the 
city—including a soccer match as France plays world champion Germany 
and the Bataclan concert hall, where most of the fatalities occur.”129 An 
online statement by IS claimed eight of its militants attacked selected 
areas in Paris. According to CNN, “The Institute for the Study of War 
described the attacks as the terror group’s ‘most sophisticated assault in 
the West to date.’ It was the worst violence in France since World War II. 
The attack is believed to have been conducted by ISIS or one of its 
affiliates.”130 
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3. December 5, 2015. London, England—A 29-year-old man attacked 
another man in an Underground metro station. The attacker “cut the man’s 
throat in a ‘sawing motion,’… and shouted, ‘This is for Syria, my Muslim 
brothers.’ The attack is believed to have been inspired by ISIS.”131 
4. March 19, 2016. Istanbul, Turkey—A suicide bomber detonated in a 
busy tourist area, killing four and injuring 36 more. CNN reports that the 
Turkish “Interior Minister Efkan Ala said the attacker is linked to ISIS. 
The attack is believed to have been carried out by ISIS or one of its 
affiliates.”132 
5. March 22, 2016. Brussels, Belgium—“Two explosions at Brussels 
airport and another at a subway station in the Maalbeek leave at least 32 
people dead and scores injured. In a statement posted online by several 
prominent supporters and by the ISIS-affiliated Amaq news agency, ISIS 
claimed that its fighters carried out the attacks.”133 
6. June 28, 2016. Istanbul, Turkey—Three suicide bombers attack the 
Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul. The attackers killed 44 people 
with guns and exploding suicide vests. This specific incident “marks the 
highest death toll in a terror attack against an airport. Turkish officials told 
CNN the three had been dispatched from ISIS’ headquarters in Raqqa, 
Syria, and had occupied an apartment in Istanbul for a month before 
carrying out the attack.”134 
7. July 14, 2016. Nice, France—A terrorist drove a truck into the crowds on 
National Day in Nice, France, killing 84 people. “The ISIS-affiliated news 
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agency Amaq described Bouhlel as ‘from the soldiers of the State,’” 
meaning the Islamic State.135 
8. July 16, 2016. Wurzburg, Germany—A 17-year old boy attacked 
passengers on a train in Germany. “The ISIS-affiliated news agency Amaq 
later claimed that Muhammad Riyad, who was shot dead by police after 
escaping from the train, ‘attacked the Crusader passengers with an axe and 
a knife.’ It later issued a video of Riyad in which he said he was a ‘soldier 
of the Caliphate’ and would ‘carry out a martyrdom operation in 
Germany.’ The attack is believed to have been inspired by ISIS.”136 
9. December 19, 2016. Berlin, Germany—A terrorist drove through a 
crowd at a Christmas market in the center of Berlin on Monday, December 
19. “ISIS claimed one of its ‘soldiers’ was responsible for the terror attack 
which killed 12 innocent victims and injured nearly 50 others.”137 
The possibility of FTFs posing as migrants and carrying out terrorist attacks is not 
the only security concern surrounding the migrant crisis but it does perhaps have the most 
hype around it. Most Europeans and other Westerners are aware of the possibility of FTFs 
posing as migrants and conducting terrorist attacks on European soil. This has instilled a 
fear in Europeans and other Westerners, and has created a sense of xenophobia towards the 
migrants. The migrant crisis does pose other security risks and problems such as the 
overcrowding of public spaces, overcrowding public transport, overwhelming the host 
nation’s inability to support the high volume of migrants and refugees and supply them 
with food, water and shelter. The high influx of migrants in Greece has created a huge 
financial burden on the country that was already crippled from the 2008 crisis. The near 
1 million migrants in Greece have increased the country’s population by almost 10 percent. 
Because Greece does not have the financial capability to handle the migrant crisis, it had 
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requested financial assistance and other forms of assistance from the EU. To help share the 
burden of assisting the migrants, the EU has mandated that other countries will host them. 
Figure 4 shows the number of migrants to be taken by EU member countries. 
  
Figure 4.  Number of migrants to be taken per country.138 
Additionally, the migrants are creating political problems for other countries in the 
EU by requesting asylum. If a migrant requests asylum and is granted refugee status, he or 
she is entitled to healthcare, a residence permit and access to the labor market, all provided 
by the state within which they apply for asylum.139 
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F. THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND FOREIGN 
TERRORIST FIGHTER FLOW 
The migrant crisis has serious security implications for the EU as seen with the 
number of terrorist attacks from 2014 to 2016 that could be connected with the foreign 
terrorist fighter flow. The EU has received heavy criticism for how slowly and maladroitly 
it has handled the migrant crisis. With the arrival of nearly one million migrants in 2015, 
the EU has been under immense political pressure to find an adequate solution.  
The EU’s first attempt to alleviate pressure from Greece and Italy came in 
September 2015. The EU’s plan was to share the burden of hosting the migrants by all the 
EU. The EU proposed to redistribute 160,000 migrants from Italy and Greece among other 
EU member states over a two-year period. (For the exact numbers per country, please refer 
to Figure 4 above). However, as of March 2016, only 660 total refugees had been relocated 
from Greece and Italy.140 As of July 2016, only 3,300 migrants had been relocated from 
these two countries.141  
Also in March 2016, the EU made an agreement with the government of Turkey 
that stipulated that irregular migrants and asylum seekers that have arrived from Turkey 
may be returned to Turkey, and in return, the EU will accept a migrant who has not chosen 
the irregular migration route.142 Also, the EU has promised Turkey a 3 billion Euro facility 
in which to house the migrants.  
Again in March 2016, the EU announced that the Western Balkan route, the most 
popular irregular migration route, and possibly the route chosen by FTFs, was closed 
because of the border fence built by Hungary on its border with Serbia in September 
2015.143 This border closure did slow the rate at which migrants entered the EU. But it 
also just altered their path, with the new route through Croatia.  
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To alleviate some of the political pressure placed on the EU, the EU been 
attempting to reform and standardize its asylum request process. The EU was under 
pressure to implement these changes because so many asylum requests were being filed 
for in Greece. The original system, established in 1999, stipulated that asylum requests 
were processed in the country in which they applied.144 Clearly this was a troublesome 
task for a country like Greece because it simply could not keep pace with the tens of 
thousands of applications it received.  
Perhaps the most important mitigation mechanism put in place by the EU was the 
establishment of the EU’s border control and coast guard agency within Frontex in 
2016.145 Before the EU had established this agency within Frontex, Frontex itself struggled 
to help the authorities in individual countries to manage the migration flows by establishing 
reception centres around Europe.146 This new agency was to be the action arm of the 
institution. It remains to be seen how effective this new agency will be at stopping irregular 
migration and possibly the flow of FTFs. 
G. WAY AHEAD FOR THE EU  
The Eastern Mediterranean route used by migrants and possibly foreign terrorist 
fighters to enter Greece and the rest of Europe has serious security implications for the EU. 
The migration crisis in Europe has been more troublesome and more extensive than most 
people expected or imagined. Europe was subjected to several serious terrorist attacks from 
2014 to 2016 that could have been carried out by FTFs using the Eastern Mediterranean 
route to travel from Europe through Turkey into Iraq or Syria, and then back into Europe 
in the opposite direction. IS and its influence on the migrants, real or imagined, have been 
a top security concern for the EU. The EU has made several attempts to alleviate the 
pressure and burden placed certain EU member states in this continuing migrant crisis. But 
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these mitigations have been slow and insufficient. The EU has fallen very short of its goal 
when it comes to its migrant distribution plan. The EU is still attempting to revise its 
asylum requests protocols and procedures to alleviate the pressure felt by Greece, Italy and 
Hungary. The EU has established the border control and coast guard agency within Frontex 
but tangible results in stemming the migrant flow as a result of this agency remain to be 
seen. The migrant flow in the Eastern Mediterranean has been slowing since the summer 
of 2016, but the damage has already been done and the EU is continuing to deal with 
ramifications of the migrant crisis.  
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V. NATO, THE GREEK MIGRANT CRISIS AND FOREIGN 
TERRORIST FIGHTERS 
One of the most pressing threats to NATO resides in the migration crisis burdening 
Greece. The Greek Government’s inability, along with NATO’s and the EU’s inability, to 
stop the flow of migrants transiting from Africa and the greater Middle East to other 
European countries could lead to an existential threat to NATO and Europe. Undocumented 
migrants pose potential security risks because foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) can mask 
their movement to and from conflict areas by utilizing the irregular migrant crossings 
highlighted in the Greek migrant crisis. Since the June 2014 establishment of the 
“caliphate”, there have been 51 terrorist attacks in North America and Europe.147 In that 
same period, 29 of those 51 terrorist attacks carried out in North America and in Europe 
have been directly linked to the Islamic State (IS).148 Terrorism and its link to the migrant 
crisis through foreign terrorist fighters posing as migrants constitute a significant threat to 
the Alliance. 
This research requires explanation from two broad areas of research. One area of 
research is terrorism, including foreign terrorist fighters, and the other is migration, 
specifically the Greek migration crisis. These two areas of research intersect in the specific 
study of foreign terrorist fighters posing as migrants in Greece. An examination of the 
Greek migrant crisis and the terrorist threat to Europe and an exploration of the possibility 
that FTFs are posing as migrants are required. 
Not all migrants are terrorists. In fact, all most all migrants have zero affiliation 
with and are openly opposed to the terrorists who may hiding in their ranks. Most migrants 
are fleeing war torn countries in the Middle East and have arrived in Europe seeking safety 
and economic opportunity. However, there is some correlation between the Greek migrant 
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crisis and terrorism, even though it may be small. One expert claims that of the “51 attacks 
in Europe and North America…Only 5 percent of those who carried out the attacks were 
refugees or asylum seekers.”149 Approximately twenty percent of terrorist attacks involve 
foreign terrorist fighters.150 While these numbers are small, they are still significant, 
especially the FTF statistic. 
One expert suggests that over 5,000 “Western” foreign terrorist fighters have 
traveled from Europe to Iraq or Syria since 2011.151 Several estimates put the total number 
of FTFs at 20,000, making the wars in Iraq and Syria some of the largest receivers of FTFs 
in history.152 The fact that FTFs could be posing as migrants travelling to Europe through 
the irregular border crossings employed in the Greek migrant crisis poses a “serious and 
significant” threat to NATO and Europe.153  
There is a high probability that IS foreign terrorist fighters have entered Europe, 
through Greece, disguised as migrants. After the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, 
two Syrian passports were found near the bodies of the terrorists, leading to the 
“speculation that terrorists were infiltrating the refugee flows to the EU.”154 This judgment 
was later supported in a more definitive statement by the 2017 EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report (TE-SAT) which stated that “the irregular migrant flow was exploited in 
order to dispatch terrorist operatives clandestinely to Europe.”155 Furthermore, the 2017 
TE-SAT acknowledged that this trend is continuing and reported: 
The influx of refugees and migrants to Europe from existing and new 
conflict zones is expected to continue. IS has already exploited the flow of 
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refugees and migrants to send individuals to Europe to commit acts of 
terrorism, which became evident in the 2015 Paris attacks. IS and possibly 
other jihadist terrorist organisations may continue to do so.156 
This report by European experts confirms the possibility that foreign terrorist 
fighters are posing as migrants travelling from IS-controlled territory in the Middle East 
into Europe via Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean route. FTFs posing as migrants that 
could carry out terrorist attacks are a real and direct threat to Europe and NATO. Stunting 
the flow of irregular migrants, which could be used by IS to “clandestinely” smuggle FTFs 
and operatives, should be a top security concern for NATO.  
According to the NATO website, “terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of 
the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity.”157 In 
contrast with the “indirect” threat of Russia asserting its dominance in Eastern Europe, the 
threat of terrorism is felt all over Europe. The NATO Allies agree that the terrorist threat 
stemming from the migrant population is a serious security challenge facing Europe. 
According to the Warsaw Summit Communiqué,  
Terrorism, particularly as perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL)/Da’esh, has risen to an unprecedented level of 
intensity, reaches into all of Allied territory, and now represents an 
immediate and direct threat to our nations and the international community. 
Instability in the Middle East and North Africa also contributes to the 
refugee and migrant crisis.158 
Since NATO’s inception there has only been one instance in which Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty has been invoked. It was in response to the terrorist attacks against 
the United States on September 11, 2001. After the Paris terrorist attacks in November 
2015, France seriously debated invoking Article 5 in order to have an Allied effort to fight 
IS.159 The French considered the need to possibly invoke this Article because they 
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regarded this act of terrorism as a serious and grave threat to their national security that 
would only continue as more FTFs came into Europe through Greece disguised as 
migrants. Terrorism has proved to be a considerable threat to NATO. Terrorism via FTFs 
hiding among the migrant population continues to challenge NATO on its southern flank 
as the migrant crisis in Greece continues.  
Yet some experts claim that NATO is not the best organization to respond to the 
FTF threat because most European governments do not want to see the “international 
militarization” of what they consider a domestic problem that could be handled with local 
law enforcement.160 Most European governments agree that the EU and its border control 
agency FRONTEX are best suited to respond to the Greek migrant crisis. However, NATO 
could have a role in counterterrorism efforts and responding to the Greek migrant crisis.  
A. THE GREEK MIGRANT CRISIS BY THE NUMBERS 
The number of migrants entering Europe through Greece from 2014 to 2016 
reached record breaking numbers.161 In 2015, a new record was set for migrants entering 
Europe as almost one million migrants came to the region in that year alone.162 Frontex 
records that “in 2015, some 885,000 migrants arrived in the EU via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route—17 times the number in in 2014, which was itself a record year.” In 
comparison to Greece, Italy only received approximately 150,000 migrants via the Central 
Mediterranean route in 2015.163  
This migrant crisis has caused problems not only in Greece but throughout the rest 
of Europe. Greece is just the staging point for most of the migrants. Most migrants 
transiting out of Greece choose one of three main routes to leave Greece. The most popular 
option is the Western Balkan route. The Western Balkan route saw close to 800,000 illegal 
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border crossings, mostly by Syrians, in 2015.164 With an estimated 1 million migrants and 
refugees transiting to other European countries via the Western Balkan route, there have 
been ample opportunities for migrants and refugees to “disappear” and escape authorities 
because of the lack of border security and accountability along this route.165 With the 
exponential increase in numbers of migrants, there is a significant risk that the number of 
foreign terrorist fighters transiting through Greece into Europe or into the Middle East is 
also increasing.  
Germany alone has willingly received over 800,000 refugees and migrants, but the 
German government has admitted that it cannot positively identify all of the refugees and 
migrants living within the country.166 In fact some “70,000 people still remain 
undocumented.”167 There is a possibility that FTFs could be hiding among the 70,000 
undocumented migrants and refugees in Germany alone. The same could be said of other 
European countries that have accepted migrants and refugees. With this lack of 
accountability, there is a serious security risk presented to NATO and Europe. 
Europe is making progress in meeting this challenge. The flow of migrants via the 
Eastern Mediterranean route has slowed significantly because of the EU’s March 2016 
partnership agreement with Turkey that allows for certain migrants and refugees to be 
directly relocated from Greece to Turkey. The central pillar of this agreement was to 
“address the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across 
the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands by allowing Greece to return to Turkey ‘all 
new irregular migrants.’”168 According to IOM, in 2017 there have been only 12,000 
                                                 
164 “Western Balkan Route,” Frontex, accessed March 26, 2017. https://Frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-
borders/migratory-routes/western-balkan-route/   
165 Frontex, “Western Balkan Route.” 
166 Rick Noack, “Germany Said it Took in More than 1 Million Refugees Last Year. But it Didn’t,” 
The Washignton Post. September 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/
09/30/germany-said-it-took-in-more-than-1-million-refugees-last-year-but-it-
didnt/?utm_term=.12a0d2eb5cbb 
167 Noack, “Germany Said it Took in More than 1 Million Refugees Last Year. But it Didn’t.” 
168 Elizabeth Collett, “The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,” Migration Policy Institute. 
March 2016. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal  
 58 
arrivals by sea from Turkey to Greece as of August.169 This number could increase by the 
end of 2017 as most migrant crossings happen in late summer and early fall. However, it 
seems that this agreement could have just shifted the migration route to the central 
Mediterranean as Italy has received nearly 100,000 migrants by sea already in 2017.170  
B. THE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER THREAT TO NATO 
Foreign terrorist fighters are referred to as “nonindigenous individuals who choose 
to engage in insurgent military operations in foreign conflict zones without the promise of 
financial remuneration.”171 Often these fighters are motivated only by their religious 
affiliation. Regardless of their religious or political incentives, these foreign terrorist 
fighters choose to leave their home country and travel to a conflict zone to join the fight. 
While in the conflict zone these FTFs could become highly skilled operators, gain valuable 
combat experience, and become more radicalized than ever before. After their tour in the 
conflict zone many FTFs could choose to return to their home country highly motivated to 
engage in acts of terrorism. These foreign terrorist fighters pose a “tremendous security 
risk to their home countries” because fighters with “battlefield experience are capable of 
committing more lethal attacks than those without it.”172  
Since taking control of certain territory within Syria and Iraq in June 2014, the 
Islamic State has established the “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. This could be a motivating 
factor for FTFs to travel to IS-controlled territories because many FTFs are attracted to the 
idea of a utopian caliphate offered by IS.173 One expert estimates that since June 2014, IS 
                                                 
169 “Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities,” International 
Organization for Migration, August, 8, 2017. http://migration.iom.int/docs/MMP/
170808_Mediterranean_Update.pdf  
170 International Organization for Migration, “Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: 
Arrivals and Fatalities.” 
171 Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing,” 48. 
172 Jayaraman, Shiva,  “International Terrorism and Statelessness: Revoking the Citizenship of ISIL 
Foreign Fighters,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Article 6, vol. 17, no. 1 (2016), 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol17/iss1/6; John Deni, “Beyond Information Sharing: NATO 
and the Foreign Fighter Threat,” Parameters 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 51. 
173 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016.  
 59 
has established over 25 provinces in 11 countries.174 According to the 2016 TE-SAT, “IS 
considers it the duty of every Muslim to join it by migrating to the territories that it 
controls…Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) are equated with the companions of the prophet 
Muhammad that left Mecca with him on his emigration to Medina and are, on this basis, 
awarded a higher status than the local population.”175 IS has been successful in convincing 
over 5,000 Europeans to travel to IS-controlled areas to join their cause.176  
After the mass exodus from IS-controlled lands, the IS launched a propaganda 
campaign featuring videos on many social media outlets in attempts to persuade the 
refugees to join IS instead of fleeing to “un-Islamic lands.”177 IS has done little to slow 
the flow of refugees out of IS-controlled lands but instead has opted to capitalize on 
migrants entering Europe. IS “recruiters may try to take advantage of social, economic, 
and personal problems that make individuals susceptible to radicalisation.”178 The TE-
SAT warns that IS has direct access to EU nationals prepared to carry out attacks. 
After the FTFs have reached Syria or Iraq to join IS, they can return to Europe, 
possibly via the Eastern Mediterranean route, as trained operatives with valuable combat 
experience. TE-SAT claims that “the training and combat experience gained by the 
returning FTFs means that they will have increased capability to carry out attacks, either 
under direction or independently. Furthermore, some individuals undergo specific 
psychological conditioning…enabling them to carry out terrorist actions.”179  
As seen with the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks on the Bataclan concert hall and the 
Stade de France, the evidence gathered by the investigations suggests that FTFs with 
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European origins have travelled to Syria and Iraq, received training from IS and returned 
to Europe, undetected by authorities.180 
The years from 2014 to 2016 saw unprecedented numbers of refugees fleeing from 
the conflict areas of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Refugees from other countries have also 
entered Europe using the eastern Mediterranean route, but the vast majority of the refugees 
and migrants come from the three aforementioned countries. Most of these refugees have 
been “predominately young, male and Muslim” and “do broadly fit the profile of those 
most susceptible to radicalization.”181 After the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, 
Europe’s deepest fears were confirmed when French authorities linked the terrorists 
responsible from the attack to the migrant crisis in Greece. The terrorists were able to cross 
the border into Greece posing as Syrian refuges and then were able to travel to France 
undetected. Foreign terrorist fighters may continue to travel from IS-controlled territory 
into the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route while posing as migrants. The 2017 
Europol report, Changes in Modus Operandi of IS Revisited, highlights another concern 
that: 
Elements of the Syrian refugee diaspora may be vulnerable to radicalisation 
once in Europe and may be targeted by extremist recruiters. Given that it is 
in the interests of IS to inflame the migration crisis to polarise the EU 
population and turn sections of it against those seeking asylum, some 
infiltration of refugee camps and other refugee/migrant groups is likely.182 
C. THE CASE FOR A NATO-LED RESPONSE  
The possibility of FTFs posing as migrants and carrying out terrorist attacks is not 
the only security concern surrounding the migrant crisis, but it does pose the most deadly 
threat. Most Europeans and other Westerners are aware of the possibility of FTFs posing 
as migrants and conducting terrorist attacks on European soil. Yet, it appears that there is 
still more to do when it comes to stemming the flow of migrants using irregular border 
crossings. The migrant crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean is a not just a Greek problem; it 
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is a NATO and European problem as well. The migrants are creating political and security 
problems for NATO allies and other European countries. 
The security implications of the migrant crisis have not been well documented to 
date. Also not identified are specific policy recommendations on how to combat this crisis. 
There have been several joint declarations between the EU and NATO, NATO and the 
OSCE, and so on that aim to “increase cooperation and coordination” between these 
institutions, but some scholars see the declarations as merely hollow political statements 
that are “lacking any real substance.”183 NATO and the EU have received heavy criticism 
for how—and how slowly—they have handled the migrant crisis. With the arrival of nearly 
one million migrants in 2015, NATO and the EU have been under immense political 
pressure to find an adequate solution.  
D. NATO AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS  
Many NATO and European security experts consider Russia the main threat in 
Europe. Despite the resurgence of Russia and the threat that Russia poses to NATO, others 
argue that the migrant crisis along Europe’s weakest flank is the biggest security concern 
for NATO and the EU.184 The adverse situation on Europe’s southern flank “appears to be 
real and growing.”185 Terrorism and its link to the migrant crisis through foreign terrorist 
fighters posing as migrants may constitute the most significant threat to the Alliance and 
its member states.  
Therefore, current NATO security policy must be aligned more toward the real and 
“direct” threat of terrorism that is a consequence of the migrant crisis in Greece. NATO is 
a political–military alliance and therefore it has the capabilities to respond to the migrant 
crisis and terrorism both militarily and politically. Recently, NATO has begun to contribute 
to the military campaign to counter IS. It has joined in the international coalition to fight 
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IS, and it has also taken the lead in Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. 
Politically, NATO has not achieved much progress in assisting the international responses 
to the migrant crisis. NATO has already established consultation frameworks such as the 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue to engage with partners on 
this issue. Perhaps NATO is best suited to assist in the international responses to the 
migrant crisis outside European borders. Perhaps NATO could do more to assist the 
international coalition against IS at sea, in the air, on land, and in the cyber domain.  
1. NATO Response to the Migrant Crisis, FTFs and Terrorism 
Within the Alliance there seems to be “confusion and division” about how to “deal 
comprehensively with threats washing up on its southern tier: terrorism, radical Islam, 
anarchy in North Africa and uncontrolled migration.”186 Some criticize the Alliance for 
not doing enough in the South, “given the scale of the terrorist threat to Alliance 
members.”187 Despite the divisions among its members, the Alliance has responded to the 
threats on its southern flank both politically and operationally. 
NATO’s political posture and rhetoric used to articulate the Alliance’s stance on 
terrorism are well documented. NATO has taken a strong stand against terrorism since 
2001 but more recently, as seen in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO has recast 
its stance on condemning terrorism. As noted in the communiqué, “The Alliance faces a 
range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; 
from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid 
attacks.”188  
Besides its staunch rhetoric in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO is 
contributing to the fight against terrorism and efforts to address the migrant crisis in the 
Eastern Mediterranean in a variety of ways. This is shown mainly through “information 
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sharing,” as John Deni observed in his previously mentioned article.189 In a Jane’s Defense 
Weekly report, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is quoted as saying that “our 
ships will be providing information to the coastguards and other national authorities of 
Greece and Turkey” and that “NATO is laying down direct links with FRONTEX.”190 
Stoltenberg has also stated that “NATO ships will not do the job of national coastguards in 
the Aegean. Their mission is not to stop or turn back those trying to cross into Europe and 
this in no way represents a militarisation of the response to the crisis.”191 NATO’s 
Maritime commander, Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, notes that NATO’s current mission 
in the region is “surveillance of Aegean migrant trafficking.” NATO ships will “monitor 
patterns of life, track vessels of interest and conduct boardings on suspicion of illicit 
activity but also for training.”192  
NATO’s response to the threat on its southern flank is limited because, in order for 
NATO to take a more active role in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Butch 
Bracknell in “NATO Approaches in Response to ISIL and International Terrorism,” it 
would require a UN Security Council Resolution or the invocation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter to grant NATO authority under international law to engage in the use of force.193 
Without any of these prerequisites being met and without Article 5 being invoked, NATO 
may not have a decisive role to play in the Greek migration crisis.194  
However, it should be noted that NATO has developed a Readiness Action Plan 
aimed at responding “to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, 
the Middle East and Africa.”195 NATO has also established a Joint Forces Command 
Center in Naples, Italy, with a specialized counter-terrorism unit under the NATO 
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Intelligence and Security Division with the goal of examining “regional threats and 
terrorism.”196  
Additionally, NATO has formally joined the international coalition against IS even 
though every ally was already part of the coalition.197 This move was “largely a formality” 
and essentially political, designed to send a strong message of official support.198 NATO 
is contributing to coalition against ISIS primarily by employing “NATO AWACS 
surveillance planes to backfill national AWACS capabilities.”199 NATO also had deployed 
a Standing Maritime Group to the region but its involvement with the refugee crisis and 
Operation Sea Guardian seem somewhat limited. But could NATO do more to stop the 
flow of migrants in the Eastern Mediterranean and possibly flush out the foreign 
terrorist fighters? 
Currently, NATO is engaged in Operation Sea Guardian in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian is the successor of Operation Active Endeavor and 
is “aimed at working with Mediterranean stakeholders to deter and counter terrorism and 
mitigate the risk of other threats to security.”200 The three main goals of Operation Sea 
Guardian are “maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and capacity 
building.”201 NATO’s Maritime Commander, Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, notes that 
OSG is about the “surveillance of Aegean migrant trafficking.” Compared to its 
predecessor, Operation Sea Guardian has more robust set of rules of engagement with a 
focus and mandate on Counter-terrorism. Admiral Johnstone notes that OSG uses 
“separately resources [sic] forces so that the Standing Naval Forces can remain focused on 
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high-end training and rapid response.”202 Furthermore, the “OSG task group will make 
several surge deployments a year into intel-driven focus areas in the Mediterranean.”203 It 
appears that NATO has a vested interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and will continue to 
have a forces in the region for the foreseeable future.  
2. What More Could NATO Do? 
While NATO is actively engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean, it could do more. 
NATO is at a critical juncture when it comes to the Greek migrant crisis. The other regional 
institutions have failed to solve this problem adequately. And with the roughly 60,000 
migrants that are stranded in Greece, these migrants could be more susceptible to 
radicalization in response to the harsh living conditions forced upon them by Greece and 
the rest of the EU.204 These disgruntled migrants could breed the next generation of radical 
extremists. These radical extremists might travel from Europe to the IS-controlled conflict 
zone and back to Europe as FTFs because “an increasing number of returnees will likely 
strengthen domestic jihadist movements and consequently magnify the threat they pose to 
the EU.”205 Furthermore, as NATO and the international coalition begin to retake IS-
controlled territory, and if “IS is defeated or severely weakened in Syria/Iraq by the 
coalition forces, there may be an increased rate in the return of foreign fighters and their 
families from the region to the EU.”206 
NATO could bolster its maritime efforts in the Mediterranean through OSG, but 
perhaps not under Article 51 of the UN Charter or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
But it could act under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to conduct 
boarding and visits to vessels in the area. 
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It appears that the NATO forces assisting in OSG are not organic to the Maritime 
Standing Group (MSG) in the region. The MSG forces in the Mediterranean could be there 
to shadow and monitor Russian vessels, among other purposes. As such, the forces 
operating in OSG have a very high turnover rate because they are sourced separately. They 
are on station for roughly two to four weeks, two to four weeks does not allow an adequate 
amount of time to monitor vessels and establish a pattern of life. 207 Such a short tour of 
duty also creates a high amount of duplicated efforts. Instead, NATO forces assisting in 
OSG should be on station for longer periods of time in order to build rapport with local 
fisherman and merchants in order to truly identify the routes used by smugglers.  
Once NATO forces have identified the smuggling routes, they should conduct 
regular boardings and visits to vessels along these routes in accordance with NATO 
Maritime Interdiction Operations doctrine. During these boardings and visits it could be 
wise to collect biometric data on those persons aboard the vessels. This biometric data 
could then be shared with other European and international security institutions thereby 
raising overall situational awareness on the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean.  
NATO could be the institution to integrate European agencies when it comes to 
collecting and sharing biometric and identification data. NATO could combine assets and 
integrate with other institutions such as Frontex, Europol, National border and customs 
agencies, and local police unit could be in the unification of Identification networks used 
throughout Europe by different institutions. According to the European Commission 
website for migration and home affairs, there are four different systems in which European 
countries and border control agencies use to identify individuals entering the EU.208 These 
identification networks and databases include: the Visa information system (VIS), the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), the Entry and Exit System (EES), and the European 
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Asylum Dactyloscopy (EURODAC). With so many different databases to check at entry 
points to the EU, it is understandable that some people might slip through the cracks and 
enter Europe undetected. NATO might assist by using its political and military capabilities 
to unify these Identification networks and databases, perhaps under its own network named 
the Battle Field Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). NATO could 
prove useful. 
Some experts suggest that NATO does have the authority to play a crucial role in 
the migrant crisis and counter-terrorism efforts associated with the crisis.209 However, 
NATO may be able to conduct boarding in accordance with International Law on which 
Operation Sea Guardian is based, particularly “the resolutions taken by the North Atlantic 
Council on 7–9 July 2016.”210 Furthermore, “general maritime law applies, as do a number 
of resolutions by the UNSC…”211 Operation Sea Guardian and the general maritime law 
provided by UNCLOS allow for NATO vessels to conduct boardings and collect data both 
on the high sea, outside 12 nautical miles and within a coastal state’s territorial seas.  
Specifically, UNCLOS stipulates that if vessels are outside a nation’s territorial 
waters, 12 nautical miles in most cases, but 6 nautical miles around many islands in Greece, 
a NATO warship may board the vessel “without the flag state’s or master’s consent if there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in one of these unauthorized 
activities.”212 Under these auspices, NATO may be able to conduct boarding and gather 
valuable information on the migrants and refugees before they reach European shores. 
NATO, under Operation Sea Guardian could be Europe’s first line of defense when it 
comes not only to identifying FTFs and preventing them from entering Europe illegally but 
also in identify and process migrants and refugees before they reach the shores thereby 
alleviating some of the pressure on the border control agencies on land. 
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This NATO led biometric database could be expanded on land, perhaps in Turkey. 
If NATO were to establish a migrant and refugee processing center in Turkey, it could 
share the biometric data with its maritime forces as well as with other international security 
institutions, in order to possibly identify FTFs. 
Politically, NATO could assist the EU and its member states by ensuring Turkey 
continues patrolling its coasts in order to stem the flow of migrants.213 NATO could also 
establish bilateral information sharing agreements with other organizations, including the 
EU and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. Additionally, NATO could 
engage partners through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI) to increase military cooperation and assistance as part of its counter-
terrorism efforts with the partner nations that are susceptible to IS.214  
NATO certainly is doing its part to counter the terrorist threat and to respond to the 
migrant crisis. NATO’s participation and success on its southern flank could prove 
NATO’s strategic relevance for conducting non-Article 5 operations. As the migration 
crisis continues to evolve and adapt by moving to the Central Mediterranean route, NATO 
should continue to evolve and adapt its responses. 
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The migrant crisis burdening Greece, the EU, and NATO, has several serious 
security implications. These implications are pervasive, affecting every facet of life in 
Europe. From the hotels and resorts turned into reception facilities on the small islands of 
Greece, to the victims of the Paris attacks in November 2015, and to the crews of the NATO 
ships on patrol under Operation Sea Guardian, all of Europe is intimately affected by this 
crisis. Given the responses to date by the Greek government, NATO and the EU, it is 
evident that if the current policies remain unrevised, the situation will continue to be grave 
and could become more problematic.  
The case has been made that there is a high probability that IS foreign terrorist 
fighters have entered Europe, through Greece, disguised as migrants. Furthermore, it is 
likely that the Islamic State could have motives for systematically sending trained 
operatives from IS-controlled territory into Europe by means of IS-affiliated human 
smuggling and trafficking networks, in order to plan and carry out future attacks. Given 
the extremely porous borders on Europe’s southern flank, coupled with the crippling 
internal machinations of the Greek government, the Islamic State could still have 
opportunities to send its remaining operatives and FTFs to Europe disguised as migrants 
before the group is degraded and pushed further underground.  
The exact routes and methods by which IS sends trained operatives and foreign 
fighters to Europe have yet to be thoroughly explored and charted. In those routes and 
methods may be found the nexus where terrorism, migration, and illegal smuggling 
overlap. Trained IS operatives and foreign fighter returnees could continue to utilize the 
illegal migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks generated from the European 
migrant crisis to ensure their undetected movement into Europe with the aim of carrying 
out future attacks.  
Greece is where the nexus of the migrant crisis, terrorism, and human smuggling 
has surfaced. Greece is at the forefront of this remarkable security challenge combining 
international terrorism, human trafficking, and illegal migration. Unfortunately, it appears 
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that Greece is not well suited to cope with a challenge of this magnitude and scope. The 
inadequate Greek migration policy responses and the hostile social attitudes towards the 
migrants have propelled many migrants to opt for an expedited exit from Greece, mainly 
with the help of illegal smugglers, which only pushed the problem to other European 
nations. 
Because of the fragile situation in the Greece, there are numerous strategic and 
financial benefits for the Islamic State created from migrant crisis, especially as the group 
continues to lose territory in Iraq and Syria. As a last ditch effort to expand the reach of its 
ideology and garner future supporters, given the fact that Greek borders remain porous, the 
IS could have the impetus to send its European born FTFs back to Europe before the group 
is degraded. In addition to the permeable borders, the IS may have exploited the Greek 
government’s inadequate responses and the overwhelming public resentment in Greece 
towards the migrants. The IS could therefore be actively trying to recruit operatives and 
supporters from among the migrants stranded in Greece as they could have the strongest 
grievances and motivation to join the IS because of their current situation.  
In order to alleviate pressure inside Greece and prevent FTFs from conducting more 
attacks within Europe, Greece and its NATO Allies and EU partners should focus on two 
areas. The first is exposing the routes and methods by which migrants enter Greece at 
illegal border crossings, including with the assistance of illegal smugglers that could be 
affiliated with the Islamic State. If these locations, routes, and methods were exposed, 
Greek authorities could reduce the number of illegal migrants entering the country, or at 
the very least gain an opportunity to properly document them. Furthermore, if the routes 
and methods are exposed, the networks of human traffickers and smugglers will be 
uncovered. If any connections between the human trafficking networks and the Islamic 
State were discovered, the possibility of FTFs entering Greece and the rest of Europe could 
be reduced or detected.  
The second area of emphasis should be on the Greek government’s and the Greek 
society’s responses that have led many migrants to choose these illegal smuggling 
networks to leave the country. The Greek government’s inability to reduce the flow of 
illegal migrants has created a social backlash against the migrant population. Coupled with 
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the animosity of Greek society, the sparse and inadequate aid and policy responses by the 
Greek Government have propelled many migrants to make their way out of Greece 
illegally, thereby exacerbating the problem for the rest of Europe. 
As for the 60,000 migrants still reportedly stranded in Greece, because of the dire 
circumstances and harsh treatment the migrants have experienced, these populations could 
become breeding grounds for the next wave of European Islamist terrorism. The migrants 
and their families will not forget the difficult and troubling times they have experienced in 
Greece, especially because they expected better treatment escaping the hardships and toils 
of the worn-torn countries from which they fled. However, many migrants have been 
mistreated and kept in limbo or a transient status, giving them no rights or hope for a decent 
future. If the mistreatment continues, the grievances and motivation for radicalization may 
be present in the current generation and in future generations. The cycle of terrorism may 
be propelled forward indirectly in this situation as IS “recruiters may try to take advantage 
of social, economic, and personal problems that make individuals susceptible to 
radicalisation.”215 
Many migrants choose to emigrate to the EU because of its economic and political 
stability and the high standard of living, but most choose to come to the EU for its liberal, 
democratic ideals promising a safe life, religious freedom, and equal opportunity.216 
Despite the EU’s many efforts to help alleviate the pressures from the migrant crisis, the 
crisis continues, albeit at a slower rate (which could be due to internal and external factors 
such the Islamic losing ground and influence as well as the EU’s migrant agreement with 
Turkey and the rise of right wing political parties promoting animosity towards the 
migrants). Despite its failures, the European Union may be the international institution best 
suited to deal with the migration crisis.  
In attempts the stifle the migrant crisis before greater numbers reached European 
soil the EU in March 2016 established an agreement with the government of Turkey, 
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stipulating that irregular migrants and asylum seekers who have arrived from Turkey may 
be returned to Turkey, and in return, the EU will accept migrants who have not chosen the 
irregular migration route.217 The central pillar of this agreement was to “address the 
overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across the Aegean 
from Turkey to the Greek islands by allowing Greece to return to Turkey ‘all new irregular 
migrants.’”218 While this idea sounded promising from a Greek and EU point of view, the 
practical execution has been poor. The flow of migrants via the Eastern Mediterranean 
route has slowed significantly since the conclusion of the deal, but as of March 2017, only 
3,500 migrants have been relocated under this agreement.219 Additionally, this agreement 
has constantly been held hostage by Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his 
attempt to gain political power over the EU with his threats of flooding Europe with 
migrants unless his demands are met.220  
The closure of the Western Balkan route in the spring of 2016 was another attempt 
to relieve Europe of future waves of migrants. This border closure at Idomeni to the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), coupled with the agreement in Turkey, has 
been in large part the reason why so many migrants are still stranded in Greece. The border 
closure did not necessarily slow the flow of migrants into Europe; it simply altered their 
path. Additionally, the border closure at Hungary, and the wall that was built along 
Hungarian borders symbolically represented the animosity and resentment of the right wing 
European leaders towards the migrant population. Despite the EU’s best efforts to win 
support from the European populace for humanitarian measures concerning the migrant 
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crisis, the EU has implemented some policies that contradict its liberal and democratic 
values.  
In an effort to modernize its antiquated asylum process under the Dublin 
Agreement, the EU has been attempting to reform and standardize its asylum request 
process. The original system, established in 1999, stipulated that asylum requests were to 
be processed in the country in which they arrived.221 Clearly, this was a troublesome task 
for a relatively small country like Greece because it simply could not keep pace with the 
tens of thousands of applications it received. While the efforts to establish reforms of the 
EU asylum process have been valiant, the reforms have been inadequate and untimely, 
ultimately having little impact to assist the migrants still waiting for their asylum claim to 
be processed. 
Perhaps the most important mitigation mechanism put in place by the EU was the 
establishment of the EU’s border control and coast guard agency within Frontex in 
2016.222 Before the EU had established this agency within Frontex, Frontex itself had 
struggled to help the authorities in individual countries to manage the migration flows by 
establishing reception centres around Europe.223 This new agency was designed to be the 
action arm of the institution. It remains to be seen how effective this new agency will be at 
stopping irregular migration and possibly the flow of FTFs in the future.  
The EU is still far from having defined a streamlined process to identify and register 
migrants entering the EU. According to the European Commission website for migration 
and home affairs, there are four different systems that European Union countries and border 
control agencies use to identify individuals entering the EU.224  These identification 
networks and databases include: the Visa information system (VIS), the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), the Entry and Exit System (EES), and the European Asylum 
Dactyloscopy (EURODAC). With so many different databases to check at entry points to 
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the EU, it is understandable that some people might slip through the cracks and enter the 
European Union undetected.  
The EU with its many action arms and agencies, coupled with the capabilities of 
national and local governments, has the ability and resources to lead a coordinated effort 
to stem the flow of illegal migrants entering Europe. However, because of the many 
different entities involved, a coordinated and streamlined approach seems unlikely. If the 
EU were to choose one area to focus on in a coordinated effort at all levels of government, 
it should be identifying and exposing the routes and methods that illegal smuggling 
networks use to ferry migrants into and through Europe undetected. This coordinated effort 
should be led by Frontex in coordination with Europol and national government police and 
intelligence agencies. If these agencies launched a coordinated effort against the illegal 
smuggling networks into and within Europe, perhaps they could identify and implement 
measures to reduce the number of illegal border crossings while highlighting suspected 
FTF facilitators who could give valuable information to expose future FTFs before they 
enter Europe. 
Finally, NATO with Article 5 and collective self-defense at its core is taking part 
in managing the migrant crisis and in the fight against terrorism, but perhaps it could play 
a larger role. Terrorism and its link to the migrant crisis through foreign terrorist fighters 
posing as migrants constitute a significant threat to the Alliance. Currently, many argue 
that terrorism is not the most pressing threat to the Alliance. Many believe that NATO 
should primarily focus on countering Russian aggression. While Russia remains a 
noteworthy concern, terrorism and its links to the migrant crisis constitute the most 
immediate current threat. In fact, the only time the Allies have invoked Article 5 has been 
in response to the attacks on 9/11. Additionally, immediately after the Paris terrorist attacks 
in November 2015, France seriously debated invoking Article 5 in order to organize an 
Allied effort to fight the IS.225 The French considered invoking Article 5 because they 
regarded the attacks on Paris as a serious and grave threat to their national security that 
would only continue as more FTFs came to Europe. 
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Despite NATO’s Article 5 history, some experts claim that NATO is not the best 
organization to respond to the FTF threat because most European governments do not want 
to see the “international militarization” of what they consider a domestic problem that 
could be handled with local law enforcement. 226 While the migrant crisis may not require 
a militarized response, the campaigns against terrorism and certain types of organized 
crime do need a militarized response. NATO is well suited for these responses. NATO is 
currently contributing to the military campaign to counter the IS and has officially joined 
the coalition. This move was “largely a formality” and essentially political, designed to 
send a strong message of official support.227 NATO is contributing to the coalition 
operations against the Islamic State primarily by employing “NATO AWACS surveillance 
planes to backfill national AWACS capabilities.”228  
Furthermore, NATO has also taken the lead in Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) in 
the Mediterranean. The three main goals of Operation Sea Guardian are “maritime 
situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and capacity building.”229 However, it appears 
that the NATO forces participating in OSG are not given the opportunity to conduct 
effective operations against illegal smugglers or would-be terrorists. Instead, the OSG 
forces in the Mediterranean seem to be there to shadow and monitor Russian vessels, 
among other purposes. The forces operating in OSG have a high turnover rate because they 
are sourced from separate nations, and those nations are reluctant to assign their forces for 
sustained periods. As a result, the ad hoc forces are on station for roughly two to four 
weeks.230 Two to four weeks do not offer an adequate amount of time to monitor vessels 
and establish a pattern of effective surveillance. Such a short tour of duty also creates a 
high amount of duplicated efforts. Instead, NATO forces assisting in OSG should be on 
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station for longer periods of time in order to build rapport with local fishermen and 
merchants in order to truly identify the routes used by smugglers.  
If NATO were to work in conjunction with Frontex and Europol along with local 
authorities, who have the most extensive knowledge of the situation in their area, NATO 
could prove a useful asset in identifying smuggling routes and methods used by traffickers 
in the Mediterranean. In essence NATO could be one of the layers of defense used to 
illuminate smuggling routes and methods, allowing Frontex and local authorities to identify 
and process migrants at the source. This coordinated effort led by NATO could provide 
valuable information to Greece and the EU authorities to identify potential FTFs entering 
Europe. 
The European Union is making progress in meeting the security challenges 
presented by the migration crisis in Greece. However, the valiant yet disjointed and 
uncoordinated responses by the Greek government, the EU and NATO still leave much 
room for improvement. While the number of migrants from the Middle East and North 
Africa entering Europe is on the decline, the number of FTFs trained by the IS returning to 
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